2021 VOLUME 28 - No. 4 SPACEHISTORY101.COM THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT Q U A R T E R L Y DECONSTRUCTING A SPACE-AGE MYTH FIVE QUESTIONS WITH EILEEN COLLINS THE “HIDDEN FIGURE” IN THE SPUTNIK DESIGN TEAM NASA, THE SEARCH FOR LIFE, AND MISSIONS TO EUROPA AN INTERVIEW WITH HAROLD ROSEN: FATHER OF GEOSTATIONARY SATELLITES quest-28-4-v2_Layout 2 10/29/2021 8:55 PM Page 1 Contents Volume 28 • Number 4 2021 www.spacehistory101.com FEATURE BOOK REVIEWS 9 NASA, the Search for Life, and Missions to 65 Liftoff: Elon Musk and the Desperate Early Europa Days That Launched SpaceX By Michael J. Neufeld Book by Eric Berger Review by Rick W. Sturdevant ARTICLES 66 Wonders All Around: The Incredible True Story of Astronaut Bruce McCandless II and 38 The “Hidden Figure” in the Sputnik the First Untethered Flight in Space Design Team Book by Bruce McCandless III By Brian Harvey Review by Valerie Neal 61 Deconstructing a Space-Age Myth 68 Militarizing Outer Space: Astroculture, By Joel Powell Dystopia, and the Cold War Edited by Alexander C. T. Geppert, Daniel Brandau, and Tilmann Siebeneichner ORAL HISTORIES Review by Rick W. Sturdevant 3 Five Questions with Eileen Collins 70 Through the Glass Ceiling to the Stars: By Tom Jones The Story of the First Woman to Command a Space Mission 40 An Interview with Harold A. Rosen: Father of Book by Eileen M. Collins with Jonathan H. Ward Geostationary Communications Satellites Review by Christopher Gainor Interview by Volker Janssen 71 Picturing the Space Shuttle: The Early Years Book by John Bisney and J.L. Pickering FROM THE ARCHIVES Review by Scott Sacknoff 33 Dr. Thomas Paine’s Notes from a 72 Across the Airless Wilds: The Lunar Rover 1969 Meeting on Space Stations and the Triumph of the Final Moon Landings Book by Earl Swift 63 After Apollo, What? The Space Task Group Review by Christopher Gainor Report to President Nixon By John Uri FRONT COVER CAPTION ISSN 1065-7738 The official illustration of Europa Clipper from about 2016 shows the mature configuration. The two long, high-frequency (HF) sounding The editorial office of Quest: The History of Spaceflight Quarterly (ISSN 1065-7738) islocated at the Space 3.0 Foundation Inc., 6615 Hillandale Road, Chevy Chase, MD radar antenna are parallel to the main body of the spacecraft, while 20815-6424. E-mail quest@spacehistory101.com for information regarding submis- the very-high-frequency (VHF) antennas for the radar are mounted sion of articles or letters to the editor. on the solar panels. Integrating the panels and the radar proved Quest is published quarterly, four times per year by SPACE 3.0, a 501(c)(3) charitable challenging as the panels effectively become part of the antenna foundation, 6615 Hillandale Road, Chevy Chase, MD 20815-6424 USA. Periodical system. The cameras, spectrometers, and most other instruments postage paid at Bethesda, Maryland, and additional offices. are at the front of the spacecraft bus in this illustration. The high- Postmaster: Send all inquiries, letters, and address changes to Quest, P.O. Box 5752, gain antenna for communicating with Earth is on top, as is the Bethesda, MD 20824-5752 USA. magnetometer boom. Credit: NASA ©2021 The Space 3.0 Foundation Inc. All Rights Reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part without permission is prohibited. Printed in the United States of America. quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 9 FEATURE NASA, THE SEARCH FOR LIFE, AND MISSIONS TO EUROPA By Michael J. Neufeld article is David W. Brown’s The Mission, a very recent account of the origins of Europa Clipper. It does shed valuable light on the evolution of Europa mission con- In late 2024, the National Aeronautics and Space cepts, primarily between 2004 and 2015, but it is written Administration (NASA) may launch Europa Clipper, a for a general audience and makes no pretense of trying to spacecraft designed to explore one of the Galilean satel- shape the scholarship on space science policy.3 lites of Jupiter. The agency first began planning a Europa mission nearly three decades earlier, in 1996. The idea In a 2014 article on the tortured emergence of the subsequently underwent a difficult evolution, including New Horizons mission to Pluto from 1989 to 2003, I three outright cancellations. That the exploration of posited a major change in the political environment Europa survived at all has to be attributed to its primary around the year 2000, brought on by the introduction of objective: determining whether the moon, which appar- competition in mission selection. 4 Those competitions ently hides a deep ocean under its irradiated, icy crust, brought new players inside and outside NASA into the might be “habitable”—capable of supporting extraterres- business of proposing and building planetary spacecraft, trial life. notably the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) in Laurel, Maryland. This in turn A long and circuitous origin is not unusual for US increased political intervention in the budget process, and European space science missions costing hundreds shifting power away from NASA and the presidential of millions or billions of dollars. Political and scientific administrations it reported to. The current study con- consensus building is difficult, requiring the construction firms those conclusions, but notes also the rise to com- of coalitions in the scientific community and in the gov- manding importance of the “decadal survey” in plane- ernments and legislatures involved, coalitions that need tary exploration: a once-per-decade expression of the to be sustained and renewed, often for two or more planetary science community’s consensus recommenda- decades. To succeed, a mission team must align science tions about what missions to support. The first two plan- goals, science community enthusiasm, engineering etary decadals in 2002/3 and 2011 both impelled and development, and agency goals and programs, while slowed the rise of an approved Europa mission. Equally navigating budgetary restrictions, changing technolo- critical was the intervention of a key member of gies, and shifting political priorities.1 Congress, Rep. John Culberson, who, unlike earlier con- The origins and evolution of NASA Europa gresspeople, was not motivated by the interests of his projects is thus a useful case study of American state or district. He simply wanted to make it possible to space science policy and mission formulation and how find life on Europa. His essential role in getting Europa they are shaped by both science and politics. What Clipper funded, and pushing a Europa Lander to follow makes this study particularly valuable to historians of it, was in many ways an accident of history, a stroke of science and space policy analysts is that it is primarily a good fortune for those projects and for NASA. But his twenty-first century story. It provides new insight on ability to force unrequested money onto NASA’s budget how the environment changed for NASA and the US under two presidential administrations is also a sign of space sciences since the year 2000, an era so recent it has the how much congressional intervention into the plane- been little studied by historians or political scientists. tary sciences budget, and NASA’s budget generally, has Sociologists and anthropologists have produced most of become the norm in the twenty-first century. the scholarship on this era, but they study knowledge creation and group dynamics inside planetary science communities and spacecraft teams, not top-level policy.2 Europa Mission Origins Popular science writers have also discussed contempo- From January 1610, when Galileo discovered the rary planetary exploration. Notable for the subject of this four major satellites of Jupiter—Io, Europa, Ganymede, Q U E S T 28:4 2021 9 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/2/2021 3:14 PM Page 10 and Callisto—to 1979, when the Jovian system in July 1979 that sci- the mid-1970s it was clear that the Voyager 1 and 2 spacecraft flew by entists at NASA’s Jet Propulsion extreme environments of Earth were them, little was known of Europa Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, host to a diverse range of microbes, beyond its approximate size and California, captured images that including chemotrophs that derived mass, high albedo (reflectivity), and showed a complex array of streaks. their energy from chemical reac- orbital characteristics. The smallest Higher resolution confirmed that it tions, not sunlight-driven photosyn- of the four Galilean satellites, was indeed a cracked ice ball with thesis. In 1977, undersea explorers Europa has a diameter of 3,122 km, almost no impact craters. Based on in the Pacific discovered the first slightly less than Earth’s Moon. Its the Moon and other solar system “black smokers,” deep-sea vents of orbital period of 3.55 days is exactly bodies, it was confidently expected volcanically heated water surround- half that of Io and twice that of that the frigid satellites of the outer ed by specialized ecosystems of Ganymede, as the three are locked solar system would be battered, complex organisms, including crabs in an orbital resonance. As a result ancient surfaces. The lack of crater- and giant tube worms, thriving at of the constant gravitational interac- ing on Europa indicated that it must great pressures in total darkness. tions, the orbits of the three can be resurfaced on a time scale of only With no sunlight to power photo- never completely circularize. The tens of millions of years. Also enig- synthesis, the foundation of these slightly varying distance from matic were the large number of lin- communities are chemoautotrophic Jupiter’s great mass produces large ear ridges and cracks that covered microbes that generate energy tidal forces, injecting a lot of energy the satellite. Both facts indicated through the oxidation of inorganic into their interiors, with the closest, that tidal flexure and heating, sulfur molecules.7 Io, being most affected. Just before although less intense than it was on These discoveries together the Voyager 1 flyby in March 1979, closer Io, could be a factor in shap- made it possible to reconsider the a prescient paper predicted Io’s tidal ing the ice shell covering Europa.6 so-called Goldilocks model of a heating, which was spectacularly In the wake of the Voyagers, habitable zone limited to the inner borne out when the spacecraft scientists began discussing more solar system, and to imagine com- imaged violent, ongoing volcanic seriously the possibility of an ocean 5 munities of lifeforms in distant icyactivity on it. under the ice shell that could be a bodies where there was little or no Voyager 1 passed at a great habitat for life. New discoveries on sunlight, but other potentially habit- distance from Europa, so it was not Earth were expanding the range of able energy gradients and, most until Voyager 2 flew through the what was considered habitable. By importantly, ample liquid water. Science-fiction author Arthur C. Clarke, having talked to scientists who had speculated about Europan life, popularized the idea in his post- Voyager 2001 sequel, 2010 (1982). The planetary science community at large was slow to abandon, howev- er, physical models that suggested that the roughly 100 km of water in Europa’s outer shell would freeze solid on a timescale much shorter than the age of the solar system. But opinion began to shift as calcula- tions of tidal heating supported the possibility—as yet unproven—that it could sustain a subsurface ocean over the long term.8 It was not until mid-1996 that Figure 1: A mosaic of Europa, taken by the Galileo spacecraft, shows the extensive NASA and the scientific community rifting of the icy surface and the virtual absence of impact craters. Credit: NASA Q U E S T 28:4 2021 10 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/2/2021 3:14 PM Page 11 got new closeup Europa images and data. The Galileo a shell averaging about 20-30 km, with convecting spacecraft entered orbit around Jupiter in December “diapirs” of warmer, softer ice rising within it to trans- 1995. Although the spacecraft suffered from a crippled port heat from the ocean to the surface. The community main antenna, the limited data it was able to transmit came to accept this as its consensus position by the early quickly surpassed that of Voyager, providing over 90 2000s, although Greenberg has never reconciled himself percent of the images and information about Europa to that model.10 presently available. While the first three orbits targeted Ganymede and Callisto, the spacecraft obtained several good images of the smaller moon. Two close flybys in December 1996 and February 1997 increased the already high public and scientific enthusiasm for Europa, as they revealed in greater detail the lack of cratering, endless patterns of ridges, “cycloidal” fault lines in regular wave form, and bizarre “chaos regions” of jumbled terrain. NASA supported an extended mission focusing on Europa from late 1997 to late 1999, and another such mission led to a close encounter at the beginning of 2000. The spacecraft operated until September 2003, when it was sent to burn up in the Jovian atmosphere to prevent it from accidentally crashing into and contami- Figure 2: This image of Conamara Chaos, taken by Galileo in 1997, nating Europa or another satellite.9 excited the science team. It shows kilometer-scale jumbled androtated ice blocks often frozen in an undifferentiated matrix that Several 1996 and 1997 images of Europa electri- looks like it partially melted. Credit: NASA fied the science team and the public, as they showed jumbled and rotated ice blocks, as if the surface had par- The crucial evidence for an ocean came from tially melted and the blocks had floated around in an Galileo’s magnetometer. Close flybys detected a Europan open sea—a condition difficult to imagine or sustain in a field induced by Jupiter’s extremely powerful magnetic hard vacuum at temperatures of 130 K (-143 C) or less. field sweeping past the moon. The 3 January 2000 flyby Exposed liquid water would simultaneously boil and confirmed the characteristics of the Europan field. In an freeze. These images, which resembled ones of terrestri- influential paper, Margaret Kivelson of the University of al pack ice, fueled scientific speculation about the ice California Los Angeles and her co-authors calculated layer being very thin. A heated controversy soon devel- that it was best explained by a subsurface conductor that oped within the planetary science community between matched the characteristics of a briny water ocean at “thin shell” and “thick shell” advocates. Richard least several tens of kilometers deep.11 Greenberg and his team at the University of Arizona, notably Greg Hoppa, Randy Tufts, and Paul Geissler, made fundamental contributions to understanding the The Rise and Rall of Europa Orbiter, 1996-2003 tidal forces on the Europan ice shell, which, if over an Years before all of Galileo’s data had been trans- ocean, could cause vertical movements as much as 30 mitted and digested, the earliest images had sparked the meters, generating significant heating in the ice. They creation of the first proposed NASA mission: Europa were able to relate tidal stress fields to the patterns of Orbiter. In June or early July 1996, the agency’s leader, faulting and ridging. Greenberg became convinced that Administrator Daniel Goldin, asked the question: “How the shell must be only a couple of kilometers thick and quickly can we get a spacecraft to Europa to follow up the many double and triple ridges must represent period- on Galileo findings?”12 There were two crucial contexts ic opening and closings of faults, exposing open water. for this question: the evolution of extraterrestrial life The thick shell advocates, led by James Head’s group at studies, leading to NASA rebranding “exobiology” as Brown University, notably Robert Pappalardo, Louise “astrobiology,” and Goldin’s “faster, better, cheaper” Prockter, and Geoffrey Collins, argued that an ice layer campaign to transform the agency’s planetary explo- that thin could not support the topographic relief of a ration program. kilometer or more seen in some ridges, or the few craters that were several kilometers in diameter. They argued for The emergence of astrobiology reflected both long- Q U E S T 28:4 2021 11 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 12 term changes in the study of extraterrestrial life and development of robotic spacecraft—best known by the short-term agency needs. Over the long term, the discov- slogan “faster, better, cheaper.” The George H.W. Bush ery of terrestrial “extremophiles” and the new under- Administration had appointed him in April 1992 to shake standing of possible habitable zones opened up possibil- up what it saw as a sluggish, underperforming bureau- ities for extraterrestrial life beyond the familiar surface cracy. He survived the transition to President Bill environments that had been exobiology’s focus. In 1977, Clinton in 1993 because of his reputation as a reformer, the same year the Galapagos Rift hydrothermal vent although he alienated many with his dictatorial style. colonies were discovered, University of Illinois biologist Shortly after Goldin came into office, Huntress, then Carl Woese announced that his chromosomal RNA heading the Solar System Exploration Division of the research group had discovered that a number of exotic Office of Space Science (OSS), told him about the nas- single-celled organisms, including thermophiles (“heat cent Discovery Program, which aimed to create small lovers”) and halophiles (lovers of high salinity) were, in spacecraft for the inner solar system through competi- the words of historians Steven Dick and James Strick, tion. Since the 1970s, planetary exploration had come to “as different from [bacteria] as bacteria were from be dominated by rare launches of big, expensive, JPL- eukaryotes.” In short, there was a third domain of life on built spacecraft like Galileo, thanks to limited budgets Earth—a revolutionary discovery. The biological disci- and increasingly ambitious missions. Reformers inside pline eventually dubbed these organisms Archaea, indi- the planetary science community, notably Stamatios cating they were ancient lifeforms with origins in the “Tom” Krimigis of Johns Hopkins APL, had pushed for earliest periods of the Earth’s history. NASA-funded more frequent missions with smaller spacecraft from a exobiology researchers began to include more terrestrial wider variety of institutions. Huntress agreed and felt life studies.13 that JPL, which had been assigned all NASA planetary The renaming of the discipline took place in 1995. missions since 1980, had become expensive, bureaucrat- Post-Cold War budget cuts and Clinton Administration ic, and slow because it lacked competition. Thanks to a efforts to “reinvent” government led Goldin in January congressional compromise, the Discovery Program to initiate a review of the agency that did not exclude began in 1993 with two directed missions, one to Mars closing centers. The smallest, Ames Research Center in by JPL and one to an asteroid by APL, but thereafter Northern California, was the most vulnerable. Center would stage competitive selections. It became the poster leadership and the Associate Administrator for Space child for Goldin’s campaign for fast, risky, and innova- Science, Wesley Huntress, concluded that Ames’ expert- tive programs, and it was the starting point for the trans-15 ise in extraterrestrial life studies provided it with a defin- formation of planetary exploration at NASA. ing purpose. Huntress decided that rebranding these While Discovery was an important context for the studies as astrobiology would help Ames and underline emergence of Europa Orbiter as a small, fast mission, it the evolution of the discipline. Later that year, he and was Pluto Express that was directly influential on its Goldin announced the Origins Program, a creative early evolution. Discussions of how to get to Pluto began repackaging of NASA cosmology, astrobiology, and in 1989, in anticipation of Voyager 2 flying by Neptune exoplanet programs to make them more politically that August, completing its grand tour of the four gas appealing. Origins got further impetus on 7 August 1996, giants of the outer solar system. The Voyagers could not when NASA held a news conference announcing that reach Pluto, then still the ninth planet. In 1991, young microfossils may have been discovered in a meteorite of engineers at JPL proposed a very light, relatively cheap Martian origin. Although that claim soon fell out of sci- spacecraft they called Pluto Fast Flyby. Goldin latched entific favor, it bolstered the agency’s political position on to that idea immediately after he came into office, as and public profile. Thus, when the first Galileo Europa it represented another example of the kind of innovation pictures were released six days after that news confer- he wanted to foster. By 1996, it had evolved into Pluto ence, the public, the media and the scientific community Express, but was stuck in study mode, as Goldin and were already primed to see the Jovian satellite as an icy- Huntress said the money was not available to formally crusted water world that might well hold life like that propose it to Congress. When JPL was charged with found in the Earth’s deep oceans.14 studying a Europa mission in mid-1996, that spacecraft The second context for the emergence of Europa became the obvious starting point: Pluto Express was Orbiter was Goldin’s campaign to overhaul the agency’s also designed as a small, cutting-edge vehicle for the frigid outer reaches of the solar system.16 Q U E S T 28:4 2021 12 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 13 A JPL team began studying how to morph it into as Outer Planets/Solar Probe (OP/SP). In addition to Europa Orbiter. The few surviving documents do not Europa Orbiter, the project included Pluto Kuiper discuss the choice of going into orbit around the moon, Express (PKE), renamed to capture growing interest in as opposed to multiple flybys, probably because it just the Kuiper Belt of icy bodies beyond Neptune, and Solar seemed obvious at the time. It was axiomatic at NASA Probe. The latter had been paired with Pluto Express as that the next stage after flying by a body was orbiting, the “Fire and Ice” missions in unsuccessful discussions allowing much longer observation. The scientific com- with the Russians about providing launch vehicles. The munity also believed that good, consistent gravimetric logic of including Solar Probe was that it supposed to go data, using ground tracking of the spacecraft to map the to Jupiter too, in this case to use its gravity to throw the moon’s gravity field, could only come from a low, circu- spacecraft into an orbit close to the Sun. As part of the lar orbit. This data was the best way to meet the primary rollout of OP/SP, in February 1997 the agency released mission objective, to conclusively determine that there the first description of what a Europa spacecraft might was an ocean. Such an orbit would also yield the best look like. It could include a small lander with a probe to radar sounding data, a key method of establishing the melt through the ice, reflecting the excitement at the time character and perhaps the thickness of the ice shell. It about the possibility of a very thin ice shell.19 would also enable global imaging and spectroscopic 17 NASA Headquarters formed Science Definitioncoverage at a uniformly high resolution. Teams, made up of experts in the relevant scientific But that orbit posed two technological challenges fields, to set research goals for all three OP/SP projects. that the Pluto spacecraft did not have, since it only flew In May 1998, Europa Orbiter’s committee defined its by Jupiter to get a gravity assist. Europa Orbiter needed mandatory objectives as: “(1) determine the presence or a large propulsion system to go into Jupiter orbit and absence of a subsurface ocean; (2) characterize the 3-D later, Europa orbit. Secondly, orbiting the moon meant distribution of any subsurface liquid water and its over- bathing the spacecraft in the trapped particle radiation of lying ice layers; [and] (3) understand the formation of Jupiter’s immense and powerful magnetosphere. The surface features including sites of recent or current activ- intense flux, primarily of electrons, was already a prob- ity, and identify candidate sites for future lander mis- lem for Galileo, degrading the electronics and instru- sions.” The desirable objectives were “(1) characterize ments and causing computer upsets that triggered space- surface composition, especially compounds of interest to craft retreats into “safe mode.” But Galileo flew in and pre-biotic chemistry; (2) map the distribution of impor- out of the dangerous inner region of the Jovian magne- tant constituents on the surface; [and] (3) characterize tosphere, whereas Europa Orbiter would remain inside it the radiation environment in order to reduce uncertain- once it entered orbit around the moon, a fundamental ties for future missions, especially landers.”20 problem that would also challenge every subsequent Landing on the surface was clearly very much on mission concept that proposed circling the satellite. To the minds of the committee, as it was likely the only way have enough time to meet the mission’s minimum scien- that evidence of ocean life, even just the chemical signa- tific goals, the spacecraft would have to last at least thirty tures of it, might be found. The 1998 NASA Space days, with the hope that it might make sixty to ninety. Science Enterprise Strategic Plan put a high priority on a That meant using expensive, state-of-the-art, radiation- Europa lander in the post-2005 period. As a result, JPL hardened avionics combined with shielding, which engineers continued advanced technology studies on added mass. The more mass added, the larger the propel- 18 ways to melt through the ice and put something into thelant load needed to slow the spacecraft into orbit. ocean, even as scientific evidence of a thick shell grew, The challenges notwithstanding, NASA garnered making such ideas improbable.21 enough political support from the President and Having clearly defined science goals and a federal Congress, thanks to the Mars rock and the Galileo budget allowed NASA to go forward with a combined images, to go forward with a “new start” in 1997. This Announcement of Opportunity (AO) in early 1999 for was Washington, DC jargon for the insertion of a new scientific instruments for the three missions. For Europa, space project into the president’s budget request, which the space agency got the backing of the Committee of is typically released in February for the next fiscal year Lunar and Planetary Exploration of the National (in this case fiscal 1998, beginning 1 October 1997). Research Council, which concluded that, due to its astro- Goldin and Huntress packaged three missions together biological potential, “the future exploration of Europa Q U E S T 28:4 2021 13 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 14 [has] a priority equal to that for the future exploration of ended Dan Goldin’s “faster, better, cheaper” campaign; Mars.” According to scientists involved with Europa and stung by the attacks, he became risk-averse. He dumped Pluto research, the agency did select instrument teams, a lot of the blame on JPL, which took a serious hit to its with principal investigators normally based in academia reputation, at least temporarily.25 The lab had to reex- or NASA, but Headquarters never formally announced amine every flight program, which may explain why the its decisions for those spacecraft. That reflected how Europa and Pluto science instrument selections were quickly OP/SP’s problems escalated.22 shelved. For Europa Orbiter, once project engineering began McNamee, who had been saddled with very spar- in earnest in 1998, the optimistic assumptions of two tan budgets for the two Mars probes, pushed more con- years earlier—a design based on the tiny, highly integrat- servative engineering designs on OP/SP, and after the ed Pluto Express and a launch to Jupiter as early as failures, the pressure to be conservative increased. In 2000—quickly went out the window. The earliest feasi- practice, that meant mass gains and cost increases. ble launch opportunity became November 2003 and the Exacerbating the latter problem were rising launch spacecraft began growing in size and cost. Partly that expenses, caused by the delayed development of new reflected the unrealistic assumptions of the mid-nineties launch vehicles, combined with Europa Orbiter’s weight Pluto designs, with a target mass of 100 kg and only 7 kg growth driving it into the most powerful and expensive of scientific instruments. Europa Orbiter’s instrument class of rockets. On top of that, new, more efficient allotment eventually grew to a still-very-spartan 27 kg. radioisotope power systems, which converted the heat But every other system added much more mass. By early produced by decaying plutonium-238 into electricity, 2000, the spacecraft was estimated at 1130 kg, and even were faltering in development and growing in price. The PKE, which was to share common systems, was 447 kg. older, entirely passive radioisotope thermoelectric gener- The difference was mostly the much larger propulsion ators (RTGs) did not produce enough power for the larg- system needed for Europa, plus extra radiation er spacecraft.26 shielding.23 Over the course of 2000, OP/SP fell apart. In Galileo data made it increasingly apparent that the February, McNamee warned of the escalating budget technological challenge of Europa’s radiation environ- problems for Europa and Pluto. Europa Orbiter would ment had been underestimated. OP/SP was closely be postponed to the January 2006 Jupiter launch window aligned with JPL’s X-2000 program to invest in new because of launch vehicle and technical challenges. technologies and software for planetary missions of the Pluto Kuiper Express was simplified and, while launch early 2000s. That included better radiation-hardened might be possible in late 2004, NASA Headquarters electronics, but X-2000’s contractors struggled to meet administrators warned in June that it could well be can- deadlines and cost goals. An early specification was that celled. Support for Pluto in the Clinton Administration’s Europa Orbiter had to withstand a dose of four Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was weak, as megarads, half of it during a two-year tour of the excitement over the possibility of life on Europa had Galilean satellites to get it into position for injection into driven the creation of Outer Planets/Solar Probe in the Europa orbit, and the rest in the few months it was sup- first place. As a result, Headquarters had specified from posed to survive there. A study of whether “commercial the beginning that Europa should get higher priority and off-the-shelf” electronics would work concluded that it launch first. On 12 September Associate Administrator would require a lot of shielding, meaning thick metal for Space Science Edward Weiler, who had taken over vaults that added too much weight. In short, expensive, from Wesley Huntress in 1998, issued a “stop work radiation-hardened avionics from X-2000 were likely a order” for PKE. He was infuriated by the Mars 1999 fail- necessity, plus shielding.24 ures and by the doubling of the combined Europa-Pluto John McNamee, named the Outer Planets/Solar runout cost from $654 million to $1.49 billion. Weiler Probe project manager in spring 1998, was also the proj- blamed JPL for what he thought was deliberate underes- ect manager for Mars Climate Orbiter and Mars Polar timation to get “buy in” for a new start and then, after Lander until their launch the following winter. When the Mars 1999, for padding personnel and budgets out of two spacecraft were lost upon reaching the planet in engineering conservatism. He split away Solar Probe, September and December 1999, respectively, NASA which was really a space physics mission, leaving only endured a firestorm of public and political criticism. It Europa Orbiter. But he warned at the end of October that Q U E S T 28:4 2021 14 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 15 “it is not clear that the Agency can even afford” it.27 competition. The details of the Pluto battle have been Meanwhile, the Pluto cancellation had prompted a treated elsewhere, but the bottom line is that in late 2001 wave of public and scientific protest. At the 31 October Alan Stern of the Southwest Research Institute, allied meeting of the scientific advisory committee to NASA’s with APL, beat JPL with a mission proposal called New Solar System Exploration Division, to which Weiler Horizons. When the fiscal 2003 budget came out in early spoke the above words by telephone, planetary scientists 2002, OMB again zeroed out Pluto. After the first plan- rebelled against this decision. A launch to Pluto was etary science decadal survey’s recommendations were more urgent, in their view, because December 2004 was announced in summer 2002, putting a Kuiper Belt/Pluto the last chance to use a Jupiter gravity assist to get there, spacecraft first on the medium missions list, Mikulski, a otherwise it would have to wait almost a dozen years for powerful member of the Senate Appropriations the planet to come into position again. (As it turned out, Committee, again inserted money. With the fiscal 2004 there was one last chance in January 2006.) They also budget release in early 2003 the Bush Administration gave several scientific reasons why time was of the gave in and made it an official program. 32 essence. A Europa mission, on the other hand, could be Weiler had asked for a planetary science decadal launched to Jupiter every thirteen months and the radia- early in 2001, motivated in part by the Europa-Pluto con- tion technology challenge remained daunting. Stamatios troversy. The astronomy and astrophysics community Krimigis of APL proposed a competitive selection for a had carried out such surveys since the 1960s through lower-cost Pluto mission, which led Weiler to ask APL National Academy of Sciences’ National Research for a quick study whether something could be done for Council. A panel of scientists would recommend, in a under 500 million dollars.28 consensus report, which major astronomical instruments Dan Goldin had given Ed Weiler “until the end of and space programs should be a priority in the next the year to ‘fix’ the Outer Planets Program.”29 On 11 decade. Although National Academies committees had December, he wrote the Administrator advocating a composed somewhat similar reports in other fields, Pluto competition, while “Europa [would be] put on a including one on planetary exploration in 1994, the first directed technology program and launches in ~2011 formal space science decadal outside astronomy was in (Europa launch determined by $ available).” He gave a solar and space physics. Initiated in December 2000, it long list of reasons for prioritizing Pluto, many of them appears to have come from within the heliophysics com- the scientists’ arguments. He called it: “a far, far easier munity, rather than NASA. Weiler followed suit a month and ‘cheaper’ mission than Europa. I don’t feel that a or so later, initiating a series of meetings and presenta- 2008 launch of Europa (by killing Pluto) is guaranteed. tions that led to the July 2002 release of its recommen- There is still some unobtanium in the system waiting to dations. The single priority among large, non-Mars mis- be ‘discovered.’” Of the four arguments he gave against sions was a Europa Geophysical Explorer to “investigate Pluto, the two most notable were that Europa was linked the probable subsurface ocean of Europa and its overly- to the search for life, and: “Europa is the clear ing ice shell as the critical first step in understanding the Administration and OMB priority, NOT Pluto.”30 potential habitability of icy satellites.” It was an33 Goldin approved it the next day. On 20 December, improved Europa Orbiter. NASA released a draft Announcement of Opportunity Meanwhile, that project limped along at the Jet for Pluto that would formally appear on 19 January Propulsion Laboratory. In August 2000, due to the budg- 2001—not coincidentally the last full day of the Clinton et crisis, JPL had begun a thorough reevaluation of the presidency. The strategy appeared to be to get it out project. An Independent Assessment Team reexamined before the new George W. Bush Administration could the choice of orbiting Europa versus multiple flybys stop it.31 from Jupiter orbit, but concluded that the stated science While the administration changed, the budget goals could not be fully met with the latter. Proposals to examiners at OMB had not changed and still believed in save money and mass by changing spacecraft systems the higher priority of Europa and its extraterrestrial life and instruments similarly compromised the science mission. In February, they cancelled the Pluto AO. while saving little money. The team also reconsidered Thanks to Krimigis, since 2000 the head of the APL the decision to make a direct launch to Jupiter, as smaller Space Department, Senator Barbara Mikulski of rockets could put a larger spacecraft on trajectories using Maryland intervened to force NASA to carry out the Venus and Earth gravity assists, at the cost of consider- Q U E S T 28:4 2021 15 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 16 ably lengthened transit times (about he was creating. But, as we saw, the idency, so it was very much a per- six or seven years versus two-and-a- Mars 1999 failures derailed that sonal passion. But he tapped into the half). While it did not save money, campaign, and Europa Orbiter grew enthusiasm of NASA engineers who as the cost of operating the space- from a small, innovative spacecraft missed the ambitious plans of the craft over a longer time cancelled into a large, heavy, and expensive 1960s, which included a nuclear out the launch-vehicle savings, the one. rocket program terminated in the group recommended such an The Discovery Program, the mid-seventies. Under O’Keefe, the approach as it increased “mass mar- primary vehicle for creating small space nuclear reactor became a tech- gins” in spacecraft development. planetary spacecraft, survived the nology in search of a mission. 37 However, it appears that this recom- crisis of Goldin’s program, and it Since there were no ambitious mendation was not implemented, as survived Goldin, who resigned in human spaceflight plans at the time a pair of 2002 documents mention a November 2001. While costs grew beyond the shuttle and station, the 2008 launch date, with arrival at with increasing engineering caution, planetary decadal’s recent endorse- Jupiter in 2011. By that point, the Discovery successfully embedded ment of Europa as a flagship mis- price for the mission had gone up to 34 competition inside NASA’s mission sion became the focus of the nuclear$1.2 billion. selection process, opening planetary project. After an “Eight Day Study” Earlier in 2002, however, the spacecraft projects to institutions in August 2002, Ed Weiler’s Office Bush Administration had deleted outside JPL, above all APL. That of Space Science funded three Europa Orbiter from the fiscal 2003 was confirmed by the battle over assessments of a Jupiter Icy Moons budget request in the name of saving New Horizons. With the funding Tour, apparently using electric rock- money. Motivated no doubt by the pushed through by Mikulski, the et engines (which use electrical mission’s endorsement in the plane- agency also created a mid-sized fields to expel ions and electrons at tary decadal, Congress moved in fall competitive planetary program, very high exhaust velocities but 2002 to put the money back in.35 New Frontiers, with the Pluto space- very low thrust) to carry out a mis- But OMB cancelled Europa Orbiter craft being the first in line. New sion more ambitious that Europa again in early 2003, but for a differ- Frontiers projects were initially Orbiter. The latter was already to fly ent reason. A new administrator, capped at about half-a-billion dol- by Ganymede and Callisto to shape Sean O’Keefe, had come into office lars. “Flagship missions,” as NASA its orbit around Jupiter prior to with much more ambitious plans, labelled the largest class of space- orbital insertion at Europa. A large ones that would put every other craft since the 1990s, were one to ambitious spacecraft could investi- planetary spacecraft project in the several billion dollars. Yet Jupiter gate all three more thoroughly, and shade. Icy Moons Orbiter was far larger with enough power, could fly in and than that. It really was a Battlestar out of orbit around each of them, Galactica. ending at Europa, where the radia- Battlestar Galactica: Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO), 2003-2005 In December 2001, the Bush tion would be the strongest. JPL Administration made Sean O’Keefe studied a nuclear-electric spacecraft When Dan Goldin arrived at NASA Administrator. He had been versus non-nuclear options and, not Headquarters in 1992, he dismissed deputy director of the Office of surprisingly, O’Keefe picked the large, complicated and expensive Management and Budget since far-more-capable reactor one. He robotic spacecraft as “Battlestar January. Beyond straightening out directed JPL in November to pro- Galacticas,” after the monstrous the space agency’s budget process- duce, “in 10 weeks, a project plan, spaceship in a television science-fic- es, which had led to massive over- an acquisition strategy and plan for tion show.36 He applied that label runs in the International Space an industry RFP [Request for to Cassini in particular, a Saturn Station program, he had one big Proposal], so that a JIMO project orbiter launched in 1997 that paral- idea: put nuclear reactors in space. could be recommended to the leled Galileo’s mission at Jupiter. O’Keefe was the son of an engineer- Administration for submission in There were supposed to be no more ing officer in the nuclear navy, and the FY04 budget request to spacecraft of Cassini’s size in the was Secretary of the Navy in the last Congress.” JPL and Headquarters new “faster, better, cheaper” world year of the George H.W. Bush pres- staff briefed O’Keefe on 31 January 2003, and he approved.38 The very Q U E S T 28:4 2021 16 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 17 next morning, the Space Shuttle power, whereas Europa Orbiter Columbia burned up on reentry, meager 27 kg of instruments ran on killing seven astronauts, which 27 watts (the power of a small light would ultimately contribute to the bulb). To figure out what to do with project’s short life by forcing the all that capability, NASA tasked the Bush Administration to reevaluate Europa Science Definition Team in NASA’s priorities. March 2003 to produce a new Because JIMO was sustained report. In February 2004, it gave the by the Administrator’s enthusiasm, overarching goal as: “Explore the and that of rocket engineers and icy moons of Jupiter and determine space advocates, however, the their habitability in the context of expense and difficulty of building a the Jupiter System.” The three areas huge spacecraft based on radically of focus would be “Oceans, new technology was mostly Astrobiology, and Jupiter System ignored in the first eighteen months Interactions.” One quarter of the mission module (375 kg) could be Figure 3: Artist’s concept of the gigan-of its existence. Congress quickly jumped on the JIMO bandwagon. It devoted to some kind of small tic Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter. The elec- tric rocket engines in the foreground had not finished the fiscal 2003 Europa lander. Studies determined are powered by a nuclear reactor at budget on time—now a normal that one could get a probe that the far end of the boom. A series of occurrence—so it approved a new could operate for three to fourteen panels would have been necessary toradiate away the reactor’s heat. start immediately and appropriated days on batteries. A seismometer could produce key information on Credit: NASAtwenty million dollars for the rest of that fiscal year. On 18 March, the ice shell and spectrometers Weiler signed the order launching could explore the chemistry of the build the outer planets scientific the Prometheus Project, as the over- surface ice and look for the pres-40 community. 42 Curt Niebur, then the arching nuclear program was now ence of organic chemicals. JIMO Program Scientist at NASA entitled, which allowed JPL to for- The planetary science com- Headquarters and now the mally constitute the project office. munity’s recollections of JIMO Discovery and New Frontiers John Casani, a legendary JPL engi- vary considerably today. To Bob Program Scientist there, recalls it as neer from the earliest days of plane- Pappalardo, then at the University “a bit of wild ride…. It was the tary exploration, came out of retire- of Colorado and now Project complete antithesis of every kind of ment to be Project Manager. He Scientist for Europa Clipper, the planetary science mission we’d shared the excitement of many over project “seemed ridiculous to the ever done,” with size, power and the creation of a nuclear technology [science] community.” However, data rates: that could fundamentally change there was “doublethink, in 1984 human space capability.39 The terms…of realizing it’s ridiculous, aerospace industry, for its part, sali- but at the same time saying, oh two to three orders of magni- vated at the prospect of a multi-bil- well…let’s think about what it tude beyond what Planetary lion-dollar program, quite unlike would be like if we had all this had ever worked with. And it most planetary spacecraft, which power to run a spacecraft.”41 His was challenging to communi- cost a few hundred million and were friend and ally in the Europa ice cate to the people that were big often built in-house at JPL or APL. shell debate, Louise Prockter, now proponents of this [project] that Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter a senior scientist at APL, remem- you can’t just flip a switch on bers JIMO only positively. It was the planetary exploration com-grew into a gigantic vehicle with a mass of 36,000 kg and a length of “this incredibly exciting, giant munity when it’s been going in 43 m. It would have a science pay- nuclear-powered spacecraft,” which one direction for 50 years, to load an order of magnitude larger was supposed to be just the first of miniaturize, to reduce their resource needs, and then than anything built before: a 1500 “whole fleet” to the outer solar sys- tem. She argues that the JIMO sci- expect them to just do a 180kg Mission Module with 470 kg of ence definition process helped and fully embrace and executeinstruments and tens of kilowatts of on something like this. It’s Q U E S T 28:4 2021 17 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 18 sociologically difficult, and it’s technically difficult The transfer of Project Prometheus was part of a as well.43 shake-up and reorganization of NASA Headquarters after the Columbia disaster. Taking advantage of the To Ellen Stofan, then an independent planetary sci- Spirit rover Mars landing, President George W. Bush entist and now the Under Secretary for Science and announced his Vision for Space Exploration on 14 Research at the Smithsonian, “JIMO came out of January 2004: the Shuttle would be retired after the nowhere” as it was not discussed in the decadal survey space station was complete and the human program process. “It was a great mission,” but “just so far would be redirected to the Moon and Mars. O’Keefe beyond” what could be afforded “in any kind of budget- subsequently reorganized NASA Headquarters into mis- ary constrained environment.”44 sion directorates. The science component of JIMO An interesting non-scientist perspective comes would remain the responsibility of the new Science from John Casani, the JIMO/Prometheus project manag- Mission Directorate (SMD), which combined OSS, the er, now retired again. He claims that the program was Office of Earth Science, and the Office of Biological and “doomed to fail…because they [the scientists] were Physical Research.47 excluded from the process of selecting the mission, and Thanks to O’Keefe’s protection, Prometheus con- they thought it was something that…O’Keefe…just tinued relatively undisturbed in 2004. After over a year shoved down their throat, and that they were going to of working with NASA, in March the Energy have to bear the expense of it, because the money to Department assigned the space nuclear reactor develop- develop it was going to come out of science projects.” ment to its Naval Reactors office, which was responsible Casani admires O’Keefe for his emphasis on technology for Navy ship and submarine units. On 5 August, NASA development and dislikes what he sees as the domination and Naval Reactors formalized the alliance with a mem- of the agency’s robotic program by scientists and their orandum of understanding. The next month, following decadal process. “I think the science community, in some two rounds of aerospace industry studies, the agency ways, has hijacked the program…you know, the ‘S’ in awarded the spacecraft contract to Northrop Grumman ‘NASA’ does not stand for ‘science.’ It stands for for $400 million through 2008.48 ‘space.’” He thinks balance has been lost as the robotic program is only about science and not about technology Yet the technical challenges remained daunting. development or public engagement.45 Yet the agency has Bruce Campbell, a National Air and Space Museum geo- never lost interest in either technology or publicity and, as physicist specializing in planetary radar, recalls a brief- we have seen, some scientists were excited by the pro- ing by an engineer from Energy, who explained the chal- gram and were not opposed to a nuclear-powered space- lenge of dissipating the waste heat of the powerful, 200- craft if the money was available. That was the question kilowatt JIMO reactor. That unit was at the end of a long that hung over JIMO and Prometheus from the begin- boom and behind a shield to keep the radiation away ning, was it affordable? from the spacecraft. Along the boom was a massive,arrow-shaped radiator array with pipes circulating liquid When the program was initiated, the estimate was sodium at hundreds of degrees C. When the speaker three billion dollars over the first five years, and nine bil- described the jitter from that fluid circulation, Campbell lion up to a projected JIMO launch in 2012. These fig- concluded right then that JIMO was unworkable as a sci- ures already raised red flags in the science community. ence platform. Curt Niebur thinks that was a solvable But O’Keefe was determined to push it through and told technical problem, but “what concerned me most about Casani to go on, whatever the cost. The Prometheus JIMO was we were piling extreme technical challenge nuclear project never fit very comfortably in the Office upon extreme technical challenge…[We realized that] of Space Science and in early 2004 O’Keefe transferred this has become so complex that getting it to…the 99 the primary responsibility to the Office of Exploration percent reliability level that we require is going to make Systems, which was responsible for future human space- it even more complex. And that’s when the downward craft. Admiral Craig Steidle headed it. Casani says that spiral began.” The budget estimate soon reached sixteen the JPL Director, Charles Elachi, told him: “don’t give billion dollars. JIMO, now renamed Prometheus 1, was him [Steidle] a number until you’ve got it good and han- so huge it would have to assemble itself in orbit after dled—till you’re pretty sure you know what it’s going to three separate launches on a heavy-lift rocket that did not be…because you’re going to get stuck with it.…I had… yet exist—another five billion dollars.49 my number, it was $14 or $15 billion.”46 Q U E S T 28:4 2021 18 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 19 Then O’Keefe announced in December 2004 that helped organize in late 2004 as JIMO fell apart. Its pur- he was leaving to become a university president. Perhaps pose was to provide scientific guidance on future proj- he was influenced by budget talks with OMB, which had ects to that region of the solar system.51 already targeted the project for major cuts. In February Immediately before or after Griffin’s comments, 2005, the Bush administration’s fiscal 2006 budget the Science Mission Directorate issued a Solar System “indefinitely delayed” Prometheus 1. NASA’s budget Exploration Roadmap that put Europa as its planetary increased, but only enough to support the new flagship mission priority for 2005-10, in line with the Constellation Program to take humans to the Moon and decadal. SMD also ordered a “45 Day Study” of a Mars. As Administrator, Bush named rocket engineer Europa Geophysical Explorer. It directed Venus and/or Michael Griffin, who soon directed Prometheus to focus Earth gravity assists for the trajectory to Jupiter, presum- on a small reactor to support human exploration. That ably to see how much payload would be gained over a idea did not last six months. Pressed by the budget real- direct launch. As a result, the instrument allotment in the ities of getting the Shuttle flying again, completing the study came out at 150 or 180 kg, including a much larger station and funding new human spacecraft and launch radar sounding antenna than was the case for Europa vehicles, Griffin cancelled Prometheus entirely at the Orbiter. The plan also called for a small lander, like that beginning of the next fiscal year—1 October 2005. In conceived for JIMO. JPL used internal funds for a fol- two-and-a-half years, it had already expended $463 mil- 50 low-up study from November 2005 to February 2006.lion—enough to pay for a small planetary mission. Calling the spacecraft concept Europa Explorer, the With hindsight, it is apparent that report writers argued that the minimum radiation sur- JIMO/Prometheus was doomed from the outset. vival time in Europa orbit could be increased from thirty Sustained primarily by the technological enthusiasm of to ninety days, thanks to better radiation-hardened elec- O’Keefe, aerospace engineers, space advocates, and tronics combined with selective shielding.52 some members of Congress, the project was so ambitious The goodwill between NASA and the planetary that it bordered on utopian. It resembled the US’s nuclear- scientists evaporated, however, when the fiscal 2007 powered airplane boondoggle of the 1950s in its giganto- budget request came out in February 2006. SMD got a mania. Instead of starting with a small demonstration small increase, but it allocated no money for Europa. project, Prometheus began with a powerful reactor and a Sustaining existing missions consumed the budget, complex and difficult mission. It was a wild pendulum notably the increasingly expensive James Webb Space swing from Dan Goldin’s “faster, better, cheaper.” Telescope, the planned successor to the Hubble Space Prometheus was able to use the planetary science Telescope. Money could not come from elsewhere, as decadal’s endorsement of the search for life on Europa to NASA had large, unfunded costs to put the shuttle back keep scientists onboard and strengthen congressional in service and needed money to finish the space station, support, but it gradually became clear that it was primari- Griffin asserted. Moreover, the agency had to develop ly an excuse for a massively expensive technology proj- the new vehicles for Constellation, which he had focused ect. Barely two years after the end of Europa Orbiter, on a Moon landing by 2019. Despite Bush’s 2004 Vision, another mission to the Jovian moon had gone under. It the president and his administration did little to increase would be an uphill battle to get a new one started. the agency’s budget to pay for it.53 The NASA five-year plan released at the same time The Slow Rise and Sudden Death of Jupiter Europa cut three billion dollars from the science budget over that Orbiter, 2005-2011 period, primarily by greatly decreasing the rate of growth. That implied that a Europa new start before In his May 2005 testimony to the Senate 2011 was unlikely unless Congress intervened. Appropriations Committee, Griffin delivered, a “sting- “Scientists are in an uproar,” stated one Space News arti- ing critique” of JIMO, in the words of one journalist, but cle; another was titled “Angry Scientists Confront he explicitly endorsed a Europa mission “in a year or two NASA Officials.” Some testifying before the House as part of our science line, but we would not, again spoke in favor of small spacecraft over flagships, which would not, favor linking that to a nuclear propulsion sys- had the unintended effect of undercutting Europa—the tem.” Supporting a new spacecraft to Europa drew praise projected spacecraft weighed over 7,000 kg fueled. The from the scientific community. It certainly excited the largest space advocacy organization, The Planetary Outer Planets Assessment Group that Curt Niebur had Q U E S T 28:4 2021 19 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 20 Society, launched a Save Our Science campaign and sev- It was time to do more in-depth studies, but eral sympathetic congresspeople said they would try to nobody was willing to just say: let’s study a Europa increase SMD’s appropriation. Republican Rep. John mission, because there was still a lot of bad memories Culberson of Texas, notably, spoke out strongly, in one from JIMO and from Europa Orbiter. So instead, of the first times he became publicly visible on the topic what Jim [Green] and I put together was, we’ll sort of of Europa and space science. In the end, there was some do a competition, then. We’ll study a Titan mission, redistribution of funds inside NASA’s budget, but no sig- because we were getting data back from Cassini nificant increase and no new start for Europa in 2006.54 showing Titan was extremely cool. We’ll do one for In order to put the project on a stronger footing, Europa, and we’ll do one for Ganymede. And then at JPL recruited Bob Pappalardo from the University of the last minute, given the results we were seeing Colorado to be the lead scientist for Europa. It also pro- about Enceladus and the surprises there, we added57 posed a Europa alliance to APL, in a move to neutralize Enceladus to the mix as well. rivalry and bolster the support of Maryland’s congres- The latter was a small satellite of Saturn that was sional delegation, notably Sen. Mikulski. According to apparently spewing out water from its south polar region, JPL Director Elachi, he also appreciated APL’s technical indicating that it too might have a subsurface ocean. The capability at a time when JPL’s workforce was taxed Cassini spacecraft had reached Saturn at the end of 2004 with other missions. After initial two-way discussions and it dropped off the European Space Agency’s and consultation with NASA Headquarters, the two insti- Huygens probe, which landed on the giant moon Titan in tutions signed a memorandum of agreement on 15 January 2005. As a result, the Saturnian moons were now September 2006, giving the Hopkins laboratory 20 to 25 in competition with Jovian ones for the next outer planets percent of Europa work. (While APL was roughly the flagship mission. same size as JPL, around 5000 people, it mostly worked The four teams delivered their reports in August for the navy; its Space Department was considerably 2007, four months after New Horizons Principal smaller than JPL.) This alliance was a testimony to how Investigator Alan Stern became associate administrator for much competition had changed NASA planetary explo- science. In December, he decided that Europa and Titan ration since the mid-1990s. Missions were no longer just would compete in a second round of more detailed studies. assigned to the Pasadena center and APL was no longer The two survivors also expanded to incorporate parts of just the annoying upstart that had stolen the Pluto mis- the Ganymede and Enceladus missions, plus significant sion. It was now a major player in NASA space sci- 55 participation by the European Space Agency (ESA) andence. possibly also Japan. One of the proposals in the ESA’s That same year, James Green, a magnetospheric ongoing competition for a large science mission was physicist at the Goddard Space Flight Center in the Laplace, a Jupiter system tour ending in Ganymede orbit. Maryland suburbs of Washington, DC, took over SMD’s That suggested a natural synergy: both it and NASA’s Planetary Science Division (as Solar System Exploration spacecraft would fly through the Jupiter system and exam- had been renamed). He came into office thinking that he ine several moons before ending up in orbit around would make Europa a new start fairly quickly. It did not Ganymede and Europa, respectively. The JPL-led Europa turn out that way. Not only was SMD going through a spacecraft became the Jupiter Europa Orbiter (JEO); the period of restricted growth, the Webb telescope’s over- ESA spacecraft Jupiter Ganymede Orbiter. NASA and runs and delays posed a continuing problem, and the ESA labeled the combined effort the Europa Jupiter launch of Mars Science Laboratory (MSL), which would System Mission. The competing Titan Saturn System eventually land the Curiosity rover on the red planet, had Mission, led by APL with JPL participation, included to be delayed two years, costing hundreds of millions Enceladus flybys plus an ESA Titan lander and balloon more. Even without these budgetary woes, there was still (Titan is the only satellite with a major atmosphere).58 the Europa mission’s price tag. In March 2007 NASA Based on SMD’s future budget, which was still reported to Congress that it would cost two to four billion 56 saddled with the large Webb and MSL overruns, Sterndollars. instructed the teams to cap NASA mission cost at $2.1 In order to keep the project going, Green and Curt billion, not including foreign contributions. That meant Niebur funded a four-way competition in 2007 for outer- potentially painful cutbacks in the Europa and Titan planets proposals. As Niebur explains it: designs. But Stern resigned in March 2008 when NASA Q U E S T 28:4 2021 20 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/2/2021 3:15 PM Page 21 Administrator Griffin overruled his cuts to the Mars pro- budget are necessary to make it affordable.” The sur- gram. Griffin pulled Ed Weiler, who had become director vey’s outside cost estimators put it at $4.7 billion, far of the Goddard Space Flight Center in 2004, back to above the roughly $3.5 billion estimated by the JPL/APL Headquarters for a second stint as associate administra- team, something Pappalardo questions to this day.61 tor. (Astronaut Mary Cleave had held the position 2004- A key difference between the two decadals was that 2007.) Weiler, seeing perhaps the limits Stern’s number in the first, Mars had been a separate category not com- put on the science, told Green and Niebur to let the teams peting with other missions, based on the way the plane- to determine the “sweet spot” between cost and science tary program was organized at the time. On this occa- return, with launch dates around 2020. The result was sion, the agency requested one list. JEO was saddled that both the Europa and Titan projects came in around with the apparently unacceptable cost, making Mars the three billion dollars for NASA. With the stretched-out preferable option. By the time the decadal survey came timelines, that decision pushed the major costs well into out, the Great Recession was pummeling the federal the next decade and put the winner in contention for the budget, Webb telescope overruns continued to worsen, next planetary decadal survey in the early 2010s.59 and Obama’s NASA Administrator, former astronaut In February 2009, NASA announced that JEO was Charles Bolden, was implementing Administration prior- the winner and could be launched in tandem with the ities to cut planetary science in favor of the climate- European spacecraft. According to Louise Prockter, the change-focused Earth sciences. Jim Green, then the head Europa science lead for APL, the team was worried that of the NASA planetary division, recalls that, in the fiscal their project was not nearly as exciting as the Titan one, 2012 budget request that came out just before the although they had the astrobiology focus and the 2003 decadal’s announcement, “I lost $370 million in one fis- decadal endorsement on their side. According to Niebur, cal year…Which was about 23 or 24 percent of my total the Titan proposal was a little too complex and risky, budget.”62 with its three elements, two of them European. Jupiter For JEO, the one-two punch of the decadal and Europa Orbiter could fly separately even if the ESA SMD’s money woes meant that number-two priority was spacecraft failed or was cancelled (it had not yet been no priority. And the bitter pill for the team included officially selected). Over the course of the 2008 studies, instructions to downsize and rethink the whole JEO con- the Europa team also focused on reducing complexity cept. The aftereffects for Green were also unpleasant. and risk in their proposal, states Niebur. It probably did The joint Europa Jupiter System Mission was dead, but not hurt that JPL already had been studying Europa mis- 60 the budget cuts plus the decadal’s Mars recommendationsions for twelve years. meant that NASA also had to pull out of Europe’s From 2009-2011, both space agencies funded their teams to keep developing their spacecraft concepts preparatory to a formal budgetary commitment. But on the US side, the next planetary decadal survey, which began committee meetings in 2009, loomed as critical to JEO’s future. In September 2010, it became a “pre-pro- ject,” meaning that it was only one step away from “phase A,” the official start of the program. But in March 2011, the National Academy of Sciences published the baseline survey recommendations for 2013-2022. The result shocked the Europa team, who assumed that they would again be first among flagships. Instead, the top recommendation was the Mars Astrobiology Explorer- Cacher, which was to cache samples on the surface for later return to Earth. It eventually became the Mars 2020 Figure 4: JEO Project Manager Karla Clark (right) briefs NASA project that landed the Perseverance rover in 2021. Administrator Charles Bolden (second from left) at JPL on the Jupiter Europa Orbiter was second priority, but came in Europa Jupiter System Mission, 29 October 2009. Behind them for criticism: “its cost… is so high that both a decrease are standing Kevin Hand (left), later the Project Scientist forEuropa Lander, and Robert Pappalardo (third from left), Project in mission scope and an increase in NASA’s planetary Scientist for JEO and later for Europa Clipper. Credit: JPL/NASA Q U E S T 28:4 2021 21 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 22 led team hoping they would eventually get both. The final report, dated 1 May 2012, recommended the more expensive flyby option as having “the greatest science return per dollar.” Further studies were carried out over the next few months, before NASA felt ready to reveal the findings in open meetings. The favored concept was now called Europa Clipper, and the study team also recommended solar panels instead of radioisotope thermoelectric generators, as it would free up mass for Figure 5: James Green, director for Planetary Science in SMD, a high-resolution camera and more instruments.64 helps kick off the “Seeking Signs of Life” Symposium on 14 October 2010, in Arlington, Virginia. Credit: NASA Rethinking both the mission profile and the power system was a Europa spacecraft design revolu- tion. Every mission concept that had advanced so far ExoMars program. “ESA was very upset with me…I had some kind of nuclear power source and ended in feel horrible about it still.” He and two colleagues had Europa orbit. Although the scientific advantages of the to fly to Paris and tell their Europeans counterparts latter remained—a global data set at the same resolu- about the latest NASA betrayal produced by political tion and gravity science that would best determine the decisions made over their heads (it certainly was not thickness of the ice shell and the depth of the ocean— the first). ESA made a deal with the Russians to launch several things drove this profound rethink. First and ExoMars and the Jupiter Ganymede Orbiter was refor- foremost, not orbiting ameliorated the radiation prob- mulated as the Jupiter Icy Moons Explorer (JUICE), lem, as the spacecraft dipped in and out of the intense which incorporated two Europa flybys before focusing zone of the Jovian radiation belts. This significantly on Callisto and Ganymede. It was confirmed as a mis- reduced the risk of mission loss and lengthened the sion in May 2012. But Jupiter Europa Orbiter was spacecraft’s lifetime, allowing it to collect more data. It dead. It was back to the drawing board for the third also eliminated the additional propulsion system mass time in ten years.63 needed to get into orbit. These advantages were long known from multi- ple JPL studies of both the flyby and solar options, so The Divergent Fates of Europa Clipper and Europa what changed? Technological advances over the two Lander, 2011-2020 decades of studying and restudying the Europa chal- In the decadal’s aftermath, Jim Green and Curt lenge was a significant factor. Better radiation-hard- Niebur fought to keep a Europa mission alive. In April ened computer chips and improved solar cell perform- 2011, after convincing Ed Weiler not to cancel it alto- ance in conditions of extreme cold and intense radia- gether, they funded a one-year JPL-led study of three tion made a lighter, solar-powered vehicle more feasi- options: a Europa orbiter, a multiple flyby spacecraft ble. Juno, a JPL spacecraft to study Jupiter itself, rather (which would stay in Jupiter orbit like Galileo), and a than its moons, was a major influence. Chosen in 2005 lander. The estimated cost had to be under $2.25 bil- as the second New Frontiers medium-priced planetary lion. As part of the process, the Europa Science mission (after New Horizons to Pluto), it was launched Definition Team reviewed the scientific strengths and in 2011 and would reach the planet in 2016. It was the weaknesses of each option. Niebur gives the scientists first outer-planets spacecraft to not use a nuclear power a lot of credit for doing the hard work of throwing out source; its solar cells provided a baseline for the “nice to have” objectives and focusing on what was Europa flyby study. While Europa Clipper officially important—understanding the moon’s structure and its remained powered by RTGs until mid-2014, further potential habitability. By the time the study was com- examination of the engineering tradeoffs, and also of pleted in 2012, it was clear that, at $2.8 billion, a lander the limited US supply of plutonium 238, confirmed the was too expensive. The stripped-down orbiter came in recommendation to go solar. 65 cheapest at $1.7-1.8 billion, whereas the “multiple- As for the flyby decision, Cassini was important. flyby” mission was $2.1 billion, with the Pappalardo- It had made multiple Titan passes since 2005, allowing Q U E S T 28:4 2021 22 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 23 a buildup of radar, imaging and spectroscopic coverage enough to make it scientifically defensible. Meanwhile, of Saturn’s largest moon. It undermined the traditional the fiscal 2014 budget request had already zeroed out assumption that orbiting the body was the only way to Europa again—Culberson inserted $80 million.68 ensure global coverage. The operational challenges of A lawyer and conservative Republican who repre- orbiting Europa were an additional factor, notably for sented the northwestern suburbs of Houston since Jim Green. Sounding radar creates copious amounts of January 2001, Culberson was ideologically opposed to data that is virtually incompressible through software much federal spending. But he had been an amateur routines, meaning that it requires either massive solid- astronomer and space science enthusiast since child- state memory storage or real-time transmission. While a hood. In January 2003 he joined the House flyby spacecraft could record data in manageable chunks Appropriations Committee and was assigned to the and then transmit it during the weeks between passes by Commerce, Justice, and Science (CJS) Subcommittee, Europa, an orbiter would have to transmit data twenty- which controlled the House markup of NASA’s budget. four hours a day to ensure receipt before radiation killed He received a coveted invitation to watch one of the the spacecraft. That would monopolize the largest track- Mars rover landings in early 2004 and subsequently ing dishes of the Deep Space Network and exhaust the made frequent visits to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. A science and engineering teams. Green recalls the impact JIMO enthusiast, he was disillusioned by its cancella- of such a frantic, short-lived mission on the Mars Phoenix lander team in 2007.66 tion. He began inserting language in the Appropriations Committee reports asking the agency to fund Europa The emergence and consolidation of a viable, studies, only to see it ignored. Federal agencies are not lower-cost Europa concept in 2012 did not alter resist- required to obey these reports but must spend specific ance in OMB and NASA Headquarters to taking on appropriations written into the bill. He also wrote into another flagship mission, albeit one half the price of legislation that NASA’s Science Mission Directorate JEO. The reductions in the space science budget plan for 2011-2015 left no room to pay for it. Moreover, billions of dollars of overruns on the Webb Telescope and the Mars Science Laboratory made flagship missions so unpopular with Obama’s OMB and NASA chief Bolden that NASA banned the term from its official jargon for a while.67 It would take three years of intervention by Rep. John Culberson to overpower their resistance. His first effective budget maneuver came in fiscal 2013. Federal budget legislation remained unfinished months after the year’s official start on 1 October 2012, reflecting the effective collapse of “regular order” in the budget process. Continuing resolutions kept the govern- ment open until March 2013, when a compromise bill finally passed both houses. It included the $75 million for Europa studies Culberson had inserted into the House version of the bill that funded NASA—the president’s budget request a year earlier was zero. The space agency was confronted with disbursing the money with only Figure 6: The official illustration of Europa Clipper from about seven months left in the fiscal year. The Planetary 2016 shows the mature configuration. The two long, high-fre-quency (HF) sounding radar antenna are parallel to the main Science Division funded scientific instrument teams to body of the spacecraft, while the very-high-frequency (VHF) develop key technologies and Jim Green also contacted antennas for the radar are mounted on the solar panels. the European Space Agency, promising up to $100 mil- Integrating the panels and the radar proved challenging as the lion over several years for US participation in JUICE panels effectively become part of the antenna system. The instrument development. In early 2014, Green also fund- cameras, spectrometers, and most other instruments are atthe front of the spacecraft bus in this illustration. The high-gain ed a study of what kind of Europa mission a one-billion- antenna for communicating with Earth is on top, as is the dollar budget could buy. The answer apparently was not magnetometer boom. Credit: NASA Q U E S T 28:4 2021 23 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 24 must adhere to the recommendations of decadal Culberson could force NASA to spend money on surveys.69 Europa it had not asked for, but in order for it to become Frustrated again after the 2011 survey effectively a new start—a formal program—Jim Green in the put Europa on the back burner, the next year he began to Planetary Science Division had to find a way to get his insert specific dollar amounts into annual appropriations agency leaders to go to OMB and argue for it. In bills. His ability to do so was aided by his collegial, bi- December 2013, he got “a gift.” Curt Niebur called to tell partisan approach inside the Appropriations Committee him that astronomer Lorenz Roth and his team had dis- and his stance as a protégé of Rep. Frank Wolf of covered, in Hubble Space Telescope data, the spectral Virginia, who became the CJS subcommittee chair after signature of water vapor spewing from Europa. Those the Republicans won back the House in November 2010. plumes—similar to those that had generated excitement Four years later, Culberson would succeed him.70 about Saturn’s moon Enceladus—were further proof of subsurface water and probably a global ocean. It also To ensure that his interventions would be sustained opened the possibility of direct sampling by flying when the House and Senate bills were reconciled in the through a plume, as Cassini had done at Enceladus. conference committee, Culberson also cultivated rela- Green told Niebur: “we’ve got to make a big deal out of tionships with members of the Senate Appropriations this.” They organized a last-minute NASA press confer- Committee, notably Richard Shelby (R-Alabama). The ence at the American Geophysical Union meeting in Obama Administration’s cancellation of the Washington, DC, where Lorenz was giving his paper. Constellation Program in early 2010, and with it the The event made a small media splash and gave Green “the hook I didn’t have before…to sell it in this [Headquarters] building.” On 20 February 2014, he pre- sented his case to Administrator Bolden and the Associate Administrator for SMD since 2011, John Grunsfeld. Green featured the plumes and a recent dis- covery that lakes inside the Europan ice shell likely explained chaos regions called maculae (spots). He con- vinced Bolden and Grunsfeld to spend money on devel- oping a mission concept and selecting scientific instru- ments for it. Perhaps because these new results had already been discussed with OMB, the president’s budg- et request released at that time included $15 million for Figure 7: Rep. John Culberson, R-Texas, chairs a hearing on the Europa in fiscal 2015. Once again, Culberson went to FY 2018 NASA budget request, 8 June 2017, at the Rayburn work and by the time the budget was passed nearly a year House Office Building in Washington, DC. Credit: NASA later, the appropriation was $100 million.72 With that kind of money and political backing, and human Moon landing, had gone over poorly in the now with Bolden’s support, the Office of Management Senate. Democratic and Republican senators from states and Budget finally accepted Europa Clipper as a new benefitting most from human spaceflight, such as start. In May 2015, the agency announced the winners of Florida, Alabama, Texas, and Utah, forced the the instrument selection, and in June the project officially Administration to revive the Orion lunar spacecraft and went into “phase A”: mission formulation. Of course, create a new version of its shuttle-derived, super-heavy- Culberson overrode fiscal 2016’s request, $30 million, lift booster, now called the Space Launch System (SLS). by arranging the appropriation of $175 million. That bill While its primary purpose was to send humans to the also specified that Europa Clipper must launch on an Moon and beyond, Culberson immediately saw that it SLS in 2022 and include a lander. The next fiscal year, could propel a large spacecraft to Jupiter directly, obviat- 2017, the bill required a separate lander to be launched ing the need for time-consuming gravity assists from the on an SLS in 2024, and Culberson added $225 million to Earth and Venus. That provided yet another rationale for the president’s budget request. In fiscal 2018, now under funding SLS and strengthened his alliances in the the Donald Trump Administration with James Senate.71 Bridenstine as NASA Administrator, the agency for the first time asked for a nine-figure Europa budget, but Q U E S T 28:4 2021 24 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/2/2021 3:05 PM Page 25 Table 1: Europa Mission Funding Request and Congressional Appropriations, FYs 2013-2019 (Dollars in Millions) Fiscal Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Totals Funding requested by NASA $0 $0 $15 $30 $50 $425 $265 $785 Funding enacted by Congress $75 $80 $100 $175 $275 $595 $740 $2,040 Increase in the amount Congress funded versus $75 $80 $85 $145 $225 $170 $475 $1,255 what NASA requested Table 1: NASA Office of the Inspector General, “Management of NASA’s Europa Mission,” Report No. IG-19-019, 29 May 2019, 3. https://oig.nasa.gov/docs/IG-19-019.pdf Culberson exceeded that too. At the end of 2018, he lost But Lander always seemed premature to those who his re-election, but the fiscal 2019 budget he helped were not its advocates. A 2019 NASA Inspector General shape specifically allocated $195 million for a Europa report noted that, even if Congress were to supply the Lander out of a total of $740 million. The bill did allow money for both Clipper and Lander to proceed, the engi- the projected launch dates to slip to 2023 and 2025, due neering and scientific manpower of JPL was already to SLS delays. Table 1 shows Europa’s highly unusual overtaxed with Clipper, Mars 2020 and other ongoing funding history as a result of his interventions. In just projects. Even accounting for the APL partnership, there seven years, the agency got one-and-a-quarter billion was no capacity for Lander. After Culberson lost his re- dollars more than it had asked for.73 election, it was put on hold, but thanks to the large 2019 As for a lander, although it had been deemed too appropriation, the team resumed work. In fiscal 2020, the expensive in 2012, NASA did fund a follow-on study. A now Democrat-run House Appropriations Committee landing vehicle had always been the logical successor to continued its support for Clipper and Lander and launch- an orbiter or flyby. Direct analysis and sampling of the ing both on the SLS, while slipping the launch dates to surface ice is almost certainly necessary if better evi- 2025 and 2027, respectively. Nonetheless, Lander dence for the habitability of the Europan ocean, perhaps remained a “pre-project”—not an approved NASA pro- even life, can be found. But if orbiting the moon is gram—and it seems likely to stay that way at least until incredibly challenging, landing there is even more so. It the next decadal survey of planetary science delivers its75 requires a lot of extra rocket propellant to slow down to report in 2022. near zero velocity, and the lander would have to be In fiscal 2021, Congress finally dropped the designed for a wide variety of icy terrain, as little would Culberson-imposed commitment to an SLS launch for be known about potential dangers until at least the initial Clipper, after rejecting previous NASA appeals. The results of Europa Clipper were received. Europa Lander rocket’s numerous delays and limited availability advanced considerably in design in the late 2010s as a result of all the money Culberson provided. In order to reduce its projected $3.2 billion price tag, JPL engineers and scientists decided to eliminate a separate communi- cations orbiter (the lander would send signals directly back to Earth) and limited it to battery power alone (instead of an RTG) for a projected twenty-day mission. Its primary science goal became the search for “biosig- natures”—chemical indications of the likely presence of life in the ocean below—rather than determining the presence or absence of life, which requires much more elaborate instruments and has proven to be difficult on Mars. Together, these measures saved an estimated half billion dollars.74 Figure 8: Artist’s concept of Europa Lander after the redesign of2016. Credit: NASA Q U E S T 28:4 2021 25 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 26 because of the demands of the Artemis human Moon the NASA planetary program operated. For most of the program were already a problem. But when engineering eighties and nineties, NASA Headquarters had simply studies of launch vibration brought into question SLS’s assigned projects to JPL as the agency’s center for robot- compatibility with Europa Clipper, that provided a face- ic missions beyond Earth. The NASA Administrator and saving excuse to open the door to launching on a com- the Associate Administrator for Space Science had to mercial rocket, possibly as soon as October 2024. Such a convince their political masters in OMB and the White launch would necessitate a much longer transit time for House to spend the money, but they effectively con- gravity assists from the Earth and Mars, but could save trolled what projects would be assigned. This is the way more than a billion dollars and be reliably scheduled.76 Europa Orbiter began in 1996/97. But the Discovery Regardless of how that turns out, with the decision Program and Goldin’s “faster, better, cheaper” campaign to allow Clipper to go forward in 2015, followed by were already disrupting that pattern. Soon afterward, approvals of “Phase B” in 2017 and “Phase C” in 2019, Outer Planets/Solar Probe fell apart and an APL-built a mission to Europa finally became a reality.77 It had New Horizons emerged as the first in a new, competitive, taken a quarter century, and three outright cancellations, medium-sized mission series. When APL became an to get there. important player in Discovery and New Frontiers com- petitions, it increased political intervention into the plan- etary program by Sen. Barbara Mikulski, setting an Conclusions example for others in Congress. In that context, JPL offered a Europa alliance to APL in 2006 to forestall a What does the evolution of Europa missions tell us competitive fight, bolster Mikulski’s support for a strug- about the forces shaping NASA’s planetary science pro- gling project, and enlist the Hopkins laboratory’s signif- gram in the late twentieth and early twenty-first cen- icant technical capability. At about the same time, JPL turies? First, there never would have been a Europa mis- Director Charles Elachi restructured his laboratory from sion without the fascination, widely shared by scientists, an organization designed to mostly do one or two flag- politicians and the general public, for the idea of extra- ship missions at a time to a place capable of competing terrestrial life. This was already a direct or indirect moti- for multiple Discovery and New Frontiers spacecraft.80 vator for NASA’s Mars exploration programs,78 but the The JPL-APL Europa alliance was unusual, as the two Voyager and Galileo imagery of Europa, the discovery of were often rivals, but it was a direct product of that envi- terrestrial hydrothermal vent communities, and the rise ronment. of an astrobiology focusing on extremophiles and exotic habitats, rather suddenly made the Jovian moon into Third, it is no coincidence that, in the first decade objective number two in the solar-system life search. of the twenty-first century NASA initiated formal That is why Administrator Dan Goldin initiated Europa decadal surveys in the planetary sciences (and in other Orbiter in 1996/97, why two decadal surveys put Europa disciplines). In an era of competed projects and congres- at or near the top of its mission lists, why the technolo- sional intervention, decadals promised to deliver scien- gy-driven Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter exploited Europa’s tific consensus decisions about what objectives were astrobiological interest to justify itself, and why Jupiter most important—judgments that were at least nominally Europa Orbiter, and then Europa Clipper and Lander, independent of NASA and the political process. Weiler’s got funded, to a greater or lesser degree. Extraterrestrial request for the first planetary decadal survey arose in part life was the primary reason why John Culberson steered from the battle over Pluto versus Europa. As the result of so much money to the last two. In interviews, he empha- NASA’s failure to implement the Europa flagship mis- sizes his lifelong interest in space science and in the dis- sion called for in the 2002/3 survey, Culberson wrote coveries of “black smoker” hydrothermal vent colonies into legislation that the agency must follow the decadals. on Earth. But Clipper project scientist Bob Pappalardo Of course, when he wanted to appropriate money for a thinks Culberson also wanted to see Europan life discov- lander project, he conveniently interpreted the 2011 sur- ered in his lifetime, which is why he pushed Lander to vey’s Europa number-two priority as including such a follow immediately after Clipper.79 mission, although it had nowhere been explicitly called out as such.81 Second, the history of Europa missions confirms that the introduction of competitive mission selection in Fourth, the Europa mission story illuminates the the late 1990s fundamentally altered the way in which changing role of Congress in planetary exploration. Q U E S T 28:4 2021 26 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 27 Conventional, district-based concerns about money and Culberson’s story provides one final insight into jobs for local institutions have always shaped political how the planetary exploration has operated in the peri- intervention in NASA’s programs. But with planetary od examined—and before it. In my article about Pluto missions assigned directly to JPL, there was little room missions, I argued that JPL lacked APL’s independence for specific congressional action, once the presidential from NASA Headquarters since the California labora- administration and Congress had agreed on the overall tory was part of the agency. If the Pluto program had objectives and budget levels. But once APL became a stayed at JPL, it would have been cancelled because it competitor as a result of the Discovery Program and could not easily make an end-run around Headquarters Pluto, Mikulski intervened to defend its projects from and OMB, as APL did with Mikulski. That may still be postponement or cancellation. According to Louise true for Pluto, but in the case of Europa, both John Prockter, the senator was enthused by the space sciences Culberson and Charles Elachi state that the congress- and remembered how she had been steered away from man was getting his budget numbers primarily from the science as a girl, but there is also no doubt that jobs and JPL Director, although the president’s budget request money for Maryland were central considerations.82 for that fiscal year was official agency policy. Elachi Mikulski used her power to protect NASA Goddard noted that, since JPL is the only non-civil-service Space Flight Center and the Space Telescope Science NASA center—it is a branch of the California Institute Institute, both in the state, as well. As a result of the new of Technology on contract to the agency—the director environment, Goddard became a player in the planetary does have a certain amount of leeway that other center program too. directors lack. Perhaps not as much as APL or other John Culberson obviously does not fit the tradi- external organizations, but he and his predecessors tional model, however, since his Houston district had were able to use that modicum of independence to nothing to gain from sending money to APL, JPL, or sometimes make end-runs around Headquarters. 83 the companies that supplied components or launch Further research is needed into how NASA’s sci- vehicles for planetary spacecraft. He was and is a space ence programs operated in the past two decades. Only enthusiast. Europa Clipper probably would still be a handful of programs have been studied—primarily stuck in study stage without the appropriations he Mars, Pluto, and the Hubble Space Telescope—and inserted against the wishes of the Office of congressional records have scarcely been touched. Management and Budget of both Democratic and Meanwhile, the Europa story is far from over. Clipper Republican administrations. His long tenure on the needs to be completed and successfully launched and Commerce, Justice, and Science subcommittee of Lander is being discussed in the planetary decadal House Appropriations was crucial. It took him several process currently underway. The European JUICE mis- years to learn how to create iron-clad legislation and to sion is supposed to launch in 2022, reach Jupiter in develop the seniority and relationships that allowed 2029, and make at least two Europa flybys. Many excit- him to enlist Republicans and Democrats on his sub- ing discoveries lie ahead, providing rich opportunities committee, on the Appropriations Committee, and in for further work in the history of the space sciences. the full House and Senate. He forged a relationship with Sen. Richard Shelby, who championed the SLS rocket. He may have learned from Shelby and other About the Author senators who overrode the Obama Administration’s Dr. Michael J. Neufeld is a senior curator in the Space human spaceflight policy early in the 2010s. The ques- History Department of the Smithsonian National Air and tion arises, however, as to whether his example tells us Space Museum and served as its chair from 2007 to 2011. anything about the changed environment for planetary Dr. Neufeld has authored numerous scholarly articles and exploration after the year 2000, as perhaps Culberson books including: The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemunde was nothing but a stroke of luck for Europa advocates. and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era (1995), Von A congressperson without district interest steering a Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War (2007), and billion extra dollars to a project is an example that may Spaceflight: A Concise History (2018). In 2017, he not soon be repeated, but it certainly demonstrates that received the Smithsonian Distinguished Scholar award, congressional intervention in NASA’s planetary pro- the highest research honor of the Institution. He is the lead gram (and in other parts of the agency’s budget) has curator of a new exhibition gallery, Destination Moon, become normal. due to open in late 2022. Q U E S T 28:4 2021 27 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/2/2021 3:05 PM Page 28 Acknowledgments gram,” Space Policy 14 (1998), 153-71; Howard E. McCurdy, Faster, Better, Cheaper: Low-Cost Innovation in the U.S. Space Program I would like to thank NASM colleagues David DeVorkin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); and Michael J. and Matthew Shindell, as well as Robert Smith of the Neufeld, “Transforming Solar System Exploration: The Origins of the University of Alberta and other peer reviewers, for their Discovery Program, 1989-1993.” Space Policy 30 (2014), 5-12. comments on various drafts. For their assistance with 5 C. Alexander, R. Carlson, G. Consolmagno, R. Greely and D. sources, I particularly want to single out Julie Cooper of Morrison, “The Exploration History of Europa,” in Robert T. the JPL Archives and Erik Conway, the JPL historian. I Pappalardo, William B. McKinnon, and Krishnan Khurana, with theassistance of Renée Dolson, eds., Europa (Tucson: University of would also like to note the helpful cooperation of many Arizona Press in collaboration with Lunar and Planetary Institute, of the leading scientists and engineers mentioned in 2009), 3-26, here 3-10. these pages, especially Europa Clipper Project Scientist 6 Alexander, et al., “The Exploration History,” 10-11; Kevin Bob Pappalardo. They gave oral history interviews. as Peter Hand, Alien Oceans: The Search for Life in the Depths of did former US Representative John Culberson (R-TX). Space (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020), 35-36; Henry Matt Shindell participated in many of these interviews as C. Dethloff and Ronald A. Schorn, Voyager’s Grand Tour: To the well, asking insightful questions that I would have Outer Planets and Beyond (Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky and Konecky,2003), 158-60, 169-70. On the history of Jet Propulsion Laboratory missed. in this period see Peter J. Westwick, Into the Black: JPL and the American Space Program, 1976-2004 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). Notes 7 Steven J. Dick and James E. Strick, The Living Universe: NASA 1 Robert W. Smith, et al., The Space Telescope: A Study of and the Development of Astrobiology (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers NASA, Science, Technology and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 105-09. University Press, 1989); Arturo Russo, “Europe’s Path to Mars: The 8 Alexander, et al., “The Exploration History,” 11-12; Arthur C. European Space Agency’s Mars Express Mission,” Historical Clarke, 2010: Odyssey Two (New York: Ballantine Books, 1982), Studies in the Natural Sciences 41, 123-78; Michael J. Neufeld, 277, 285-88, 291; Peter Weller, NASA News Release 82-45, “First Mission to Pluto: Policy, Politics, Science and Technology in “Jupiter’s Moon Europa Could Support Life in Oceans,” 14 the Origins of New Horizons, 1989-2003,” Historical Studies in the December 1982, NASA History Division (hereinafter NHD), NASA Natural Sciences 44, 234-76. Headquarters, Historical Reference Collection (hereinafter HRC) 2 See for example, Janet Vertesi, Shaping Science: 10117; Robert Pappalardo, oral history interview (hereinafter OHI) Organizations, Decisions, and Culture on NASA’s Teams (Chicago: by the author and Matthew Shindell, Washington, DC, 28 October University of Chicago Press, 2020), and Lisa Messeri, Placing Outer 2018. Space: An Earthly Ethnography of Other Worlds (Durham, NC: Duke 9 Michael Melzer, Mission to Jupiter: A History of the Galileo University Press, 2014). The two collaborated on “The Greatest Project (Washington, DC: NASA, 2007), 231-39, 253-67, https:// Missions Never Flown: Anticipatory Discourse and the ‘Projectory’ in history.nasa.gov/sp4231.pdf (accessed 16 December 2020); Technological Communities,” Technology and Culture 56 (2015), Alexander, et al., “The Exploration History,” 13-14, esp. the table 54-85. For much of the history I detail here, sending a spacecraft to of encounters on 13. Europa fits into their category of the idealized but seemingly unat- 10 NASA Press Release 96-164, 13 August 1996, “Jupiter’s tainable exploration project that serves to sustain scientific commu- Europa Harbors Possible ‘Warm Ice’ or Liquid Water,” and NASA nities and advocacy. One of their cases is Mars Sample Return, Press Release 97-66, 9 April 1997, “New Images Hint at Wild and which came into direct competition with Europa in the 2010 plane- Wet History for Europa,” both in NHD, HRC 10117; Paul Schenk, tary decadal. Both eventually emerged from that as actual, sus- “Oceans, Ice Shells and Life on Europa, The Planetary Report, 22, tained missions. no. 6 (November/December 2002), 10-15; “Galileo’s Greatest Hits— 3 David W. Brown, The Mission: A True Story (New York: Custom The Scientists’ Choices,” The Planetary Report, 23, no. 5 (Sept./Oct. House, 2021). My research was carried out in parallel to Brown’s, 2003), 12-18, esp. Torrance Johnson photo caption on 17; and I got his book only after I had already drafted this article. He Alexander, et al., “The Exploration History,” 18-20, and several other barely discusses Europa Orbiter (1996-2003), goes lightly over chapters in that volume, notably, Paul M. Scheck and Elizabeth P. Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (2002-2004), and does not cover Europa Turtle, “Europa’s Impact Craters: Probes of the Icy Shell,” 181-98; Lander or anything after mid-2015, but details the rise and fall of NASA Europa Clipper website, “Daytime Temperatures on Europa,” 8 Jupiter Europa Orbiter and the emergence of Europa Clipper (2005- January 2019, https://europa.nasa.gov/resources/114/daytime- 15) much more extensively than I can, uncovering much new infor- temperatures-on-europa/ (accessed 16 December 2020); Pappalardo mation. Where he had access to documents or participant perspec- OHI, 28 October 2018: Louise Prockter, OHI by author, Washington, DC, tives I did not have, I cite him below. 12 December 2018; Richard Greenberg, Unmasking Europa: The 4 Neufeld, “First Mission”, abridged and updated as “The Search for Life on Jupiter’s Ocean Moon (New York: Copernicus Books, Difficult Birth of NASA’s Pluto Mission,” Physics Today 69, no. 4 2008). (April 2016), 40-47. On the origins of the competition in the NASA 11 Alexander, et al., “The Exploration History,” 16-17; NASA planetary program see Stephanie A. Roy, “The origin of the smaller, Press Release 00-7, 10 January 2000, “Galileo Findings Boost Idea faster, cheaper approach in NASA’s solar system exploration pro- of Other-Worldly Ocean,” and NASA Press Release 00-131, “Galileo Q U E S T 28:4 2021 28 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 29 Evidence Points to Possible Water World 16 Neufeld, “First Mission,” 234-58. 2051; Frank D. Carsey, et al., “Exploring Under Europa’s Icy Crust,” 25 August 2000, 17 Gershman email to Dawson, 26 Europa’s Ocean: A Challenge for Marineboth in NHD, HRC 10117; M. G. Kivelson, K. K. Khurana, and M. Volwerk, “Europa’s June 1996, and Gershman, Oberto, and Technologies of This Century,” article for Interaction with the Jovian Magnetosphere,” Stoller. “Europa Orbiter Study Status,” 18 Marine Technologies Society Journal, July 1996; Ellen Stofan, OHI by Michael 2000, JPL 00-0221; Scott Bryant, “Ice-in Pappalardo, McKinnon and Khurana, Embedded Transceivers for Europa Cryobot eds. Europa, 545-70; David W. Brown, Neufeld, 11 March 2019, 4. For an expla- “How Do You Find an Alien Ocean? nation of the Europa gravimetry conducted Communications,” 2002 IEEE presenta- Margaret Kivelson Figured it Out,” New with Galileo, see Hand, Alien Oceans, 73- tion, JPL 02-0588, https://trs.jpl.nasa. 76. The lack of documentation probably gov/handle/2014/11889, and Frank D.York Times, 8 October 2018, https://www. nytimes.com/2018/10/08/science/mar- reflects that it started as a very small study Carsey, et al., “Continued Evolution of Europa Subsurface Exploration garet-kivelson-europa.html? (accessed 16 by a few people. But note that email is December 2020). almost impossible to access at JPL and Technologies,” JPL 02-1089, https://trs. other institutions. From an archival stand- jpl.nasa.gov/handle/2014/8562 (both 12 R. Gershman, R. Oberto, R. Stoller. point, it represents myriad problems of pri- accessed 16 December 2020). “Europa Orbiter Study Status,” 18 July vacy which, when combined with the 22 Bergstralh presentation, “OUTER 1996, JPL Archives (hereinafter JPLA), D- restrictions of ITAR (International Traffic in PLANETS PROGRAM: Briefing to COM- 47160, 2. The first images of Europa were Arms Regulations) as they apply to space PLEX,” 16 September 1998, copy supplied taken on 27 June after the Ganymede flyby: technologies, make documents not already by David Smith, National Academy of Alexander, et al., “The Exploration History,” classed as public difficult to access. JPL’s Sciences, Space Studies Board; National 13. The images were not released to the policy is to allow no copying of materials by Research Council (hereinafter NRC), A public until 13 August, see NASA Press researchers. If the document is actually in Science Strategy for the Exploration of Release 96-164. An email about Europa the JPL archives database and accessible Europa (Washington, DC: The National Orbiter from one day before the flyby, the to researchers, one can take notes in per- Academies Press, 1999), https://www.nap first document about the project in the JPL son at JPL, but has to request copies of .edu/catalog/9451/a-science-strategy-for- Archives system, may mean that Goldin specific pages, which then need to be the-exploration-of-europa (accessed 16 asked the question even before the images cleared. Practically speaking, those clear- December 2020), 3; Pappalardo OHI, 28 had been taken: Gershman to Dawson, 26 ances either take a long time or never get October 2018; Prockter OHI. June 1996, JPLA, D-66331. done. One advantage of doing research on topics after the mid-1990s is that most 23 Neufeld, “First Mission,” 255-59;13 Dick and Strick, Living Universe, 18- 20, 105-30, quote on 107. public documents are available on the JPL John McNamee “SSES Presentation,” 29 and NASA technical report servers, but get- June 2000, in Stamatios M. Krimigis 14 Ibid., 19-20, 176-205; Wesley T. ting beyond those publicly available docu- Papers, Applied Physics Laboratory (here- Huntress, OHI by Wright, NHD, HRC ments is difficult. When I have found them inafter SMKP), Committees (IAGA-SSES), 18948; Torrence Johnson talk on Europa, in the servers, I have put in the links below. Box 2, file: “SSES Meeting Washington, DC 9 September 1995, JPLA, D-66332; NASA 6/28-29/00.” Press Release 96-166, 13 August 1996, 18 Gershman, Oberto, and Stoller. 24 Neufeld, “First Mission,” 260, 279- “Statement of Administrator Daniel S. “Europa Orbiter Study Status.” 80; Margaret Easter, OHI by author, Goldin on the Release of New Galileo 19 Neufeld, “First Mission,”, 258-60; Pasadena, CA, 15 March 2013; Charles Spacecraft Images of Europa,” in NHD, Paul Hoverston, “Plans in the works for mis- Barnes and Allan Johnston, “Radiation HRC 10117. sion to Europa,” 24 February 1997, Florida Hardness Assurance Issues Associated 15 See the references in note 2, plus Today Space Online, copy in NHD, HRC with COTS in JPL Flight Systems: The Howard E. McCurdy, “Learning from History: 10117. The latter file also has a version of Challenge of Europa,” 1999, JPL 99-0748, Low-cost Project Innovation in the U.S. the same story from USA Today with a line https://trs.jpl.nasa.gov/handle/2014/17305 National Aeronautics and Space drawing. (accessed 16 December 2020). Administration,” International Journal of 20 Chris Chyba, Europa Orbiter SDT 25 Westwick, Into the Black, 276-86; Project Management 31 (2013), 705-11; Chair, to Jay Bergstralh, NASA HQ, 18 May McCurdy, Faster, Better, Cheaper. Amy Page Kaminski, “Faster, Better, 1998, quoted in Jan M. Ludwinski, et al., Cheaper: A Sociotechnical Perspective on “The Europa Orbiter Mission Design,” 26 Krimigis notes on “SSES meeting, Programmatic Choice, Success, and Failure paper presented at the International NASA Hdqtrs 2/15/00,” in SMKP, in NASA’s Solar System Exploration Astronautical Congress, Melbourne, Committees (IAGA-SSES), Box 2, file: SSES Program,” in Exploring the Solar System: Australia, 28 September—2 October 1998, Meeting NASA HQ February 15-16, 2000; The History and Science of Planetary IAF 98-Q.2.02, https://trs.jpl.nasa.gov/bit- Krimigis notes, “SSES Meeting NASA Exploration, edited by Roger D. Launius s t ream/hand le/2014/20516/98- Hdqtrs 6/28/00,” and McNamee “SSES (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 77- 1507.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Presentation 6/29/00,” in same box, file: 101; Michael J. Neufeld, “The Discovery (accessed 16 December 2020). “SSES Meeting Washington, DC 6/28- Program: Competition, Innovation, and Risk 29/00.” in Planetary Exploration,” in NASA 21 R. Gershman, “Europa Lander 27 Ibid.; Weiler-Huntress e-mails, 14 Spaceflight: A History of Innovation, edited Concepts,” abstract, 1999, JPLA, 99-1926; by Roger D. Launius and Howard McCurdy Wayne Zimmerman, “Europa: Extreme Sep 2000, in Huntress electronic docu- (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 267-90. Communications Technologies for Extreme ment “000914_EW re Pluto,” courtesy Conditions,” presentation, 1999, JPL 99- Wesley T. Huntress; SSES “MeetingReport,” 30-31 October 2000, SMKP, Q U E S T 28:4 2021 29 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/2/2021 3:14 PM Page 30 Committees (IAGA-SSES), Box 2, file: SSES has Faced Many Challenges,” Spaceflight 48 JIMO Annual Report, 1-2, 26-28; Meeting JPL Oct. 30-31, 2000. Now, 12 June 2004, https://www.space- Prometheus Project Final Report, 3-4; 28 SSES “Meeting Report.” flightnow.com/cassini/040612hurdles.html “NASA Plans to Select Industry Partner for(both accessed 7 October 2021). JIMO This Fall,” Space News, 19 July 2004, 29 Ibid., 2. 37 “Sean O’Keefe (21 December 2001— and NASA Contract Announcement, 20 30 Weiler to Goldin, “Pluto and Europa[:] 11 February 2005),” https://www.history September 2004, both in NHD, HRC 12625. An Objective View (I hope),” 11 December .nasa.gov/okeefe.html and “Administrator 49 Bruce Campbell, OHI by author and 2000, National Archives College Park, RG O’Keefe Resigns,” https://www.nasa.gov/ Matthew Shindell, Washington, DC, 1 March 255, E.110 (Goldin Collection), FRC Box about/highlights/aok_resigns.html (both 2019; Niebur OHI; Prometheus Project Final 187, folder 78006 “12/11/00 Weiler Notes accessed 16 December 2020); Pappalardo OHI, Report, 178. on Pluto & Europa.” 28 October 2018, 17-18; John Casani, OHI by 50 “Administrator O’Keefe Resigns”; 31 NASA press release on Pluto AO, 20 author and Matthew Shindell, Washington, DC, 15 May 2019. “NASA request delays JIMO, axes HubbleDecember 2000, in NHD, HRC 05397; servicing,” Aviation Week’s AEROSPACE Colleen Hartman and Edward Weiler, OHI by 38 Prometheus Project Final Report, 1 DAILY and DEFENSE REPORT, 7 February author, Greenbelt, MD, 7 March 2013. October 2005, 2 (quote), 189, JPL 05-3441, 2005, and Brian Berger, “NASA Sacrifices 32 Neufeld, “First Mission,” 264-74. https://trs.jpl.nasa.gov/handle/2014 Hubble, JIMO To Focus on Moon-Mars /38185 (accessed 16 December 2020); Vision,” Space News, 14 February 2005, 33 NRC, New Frontiers in the Solar Langmaier and Elliott, “Assessment.” copies in NHD, HRC 12625. Brian Berger, System: An Integrated Exploration Strategy “NASA Shifts Prometheus Focus to Surface (Washington, DC: National Academies 39 Prometheus Project Final Report, 2- 3; Casani OHI. Not everyone was convinced. Power Needs” and “Griffin Praised forPress, 2003), 1-5 (quote on 4), 215-16, Putting Europa Missions Back on the https://www.nap.edu/download/10432; Reflecting skepticism in the space science Table,” Space News, 23 May 2005, copy in NRC, The Sun to the Earth--and Beyond: A community, Joseph Alexander, director of the NRC’s Space Studies Board, pointed out NHD, HRC 17567; Prometheus Project FinalDecadal Research Strategy in Solar and Report,”4, 179, 192-93. Space Physics (National Academies Press, the likely cost implications. Brian Berger, 2003), xi, 165-67, https://www.nap.edu/ “Cost Concerns Temper Excitement for 51 Brian Berger, “Griffin Praised”; download/10477; and NRC, The Space NASA’s Nuclear Probe Initiative,” Space Leonard David, “Possible Missions to Science Decadal Surveys: Lessons Learned News, 21 April 2003, copy in NHD, HRC Europa, Titan Excite Scientists,” Space and Best Practices (Washington, DC: National 12625. News, 20 June 2005, copy in NHD, HRC Academies Press, 2015), 10-11, 21, 40 JIMO Annual Report, 15 October 10117; Niebur OHI; Brown, The Mission, 95- https://www.nap.edu/download/21788 (all 2004, JPL PUB 04-16, https://trs.jpl.nasa 100. accessed 16 December 2020); Mark .gov/handle/2014/40616 (accessed 16 52 John McNamee presentation, Carreau, “Research panel recommends December 2020), 3-5, Prometheus Project “Europa Mission Planning and Status,” 27 missions to Pluto, icy Europa,” Houston Final Report, 118; Tibor Balint, “Europa July 2005, JPL 05-211, https://trs.jpl.nasa. Chronicle, 11 July 2002, copy in NHD, HRC Surface Science Package Feasibility gov/handle/2014/39636; Jacklyn R. 17567. Assessment,” 9 September 2004, JPLA, D- Green, et al., “Europa Geophysical Explorer 34 Eric Nilsen, “Europa Orbiter Mission 30050_2. Mission Concept Studies,” AGU presenta- Options,” c. 2002, JPL 02-280, 41 Pappalardo OHI, 28 October 2018. tion, 9 December 2005, JPL 05-3844, https://trs.jpl.nasa.gov/handle/2014/10945; He is profiled in Brown, The Mission, 1-17. https://trs.jpl.nasa.gov/handle/2014 Young H. Park, “Europa Orbiter Mission /41566; Robert D. Abelson, et al., Concept,” JPL 02-1404, https://trs.jpl.nasa 42 Prockter OHI. At the time of the inter- “Exploring Europa with an RPS-Powered .gov/handle/2014/8858; Richard J. Terrile, view, she was director of the Lunar and Orbiter Spacecraft,” 4 March 2006, JPL “Alien Oceans: The Future of Europa Planetary Institute, but has since returned 05-3219, https://trs.jpl.nasa.gov/handle/ Exploration,” revised 2002 Bioastronomy to APL. She is profiled in Brown, The 2014/40188; Robert D. Abelson, “Europa abstract, JPL 02-1423, https://trs.jpl.nasa Mission, 34-46. Geophysical Explorer (EGE) Mission .gov/handle /2014/8868; Jerry Langmaier 43 Curt Niebur, OHI by author and Concept,” 15 February 2006, JPL 06-0411, and John Elliott, “Assessment of Alternative Matthew Shindell, Washington, DC, 30 May https://trs.jpl.nasa.gov/handle/2014/ Europa Mission Architectures,” January 2019. 38764; Torrence V. Johnson, et al., “Europa 2008, JPL Pub. 08-1, https://trs.jpl.nasa Exploration: Challenges and Solutions,” 27 .gov/handle/2014/40725 (all accessed 16 44 Stofan OHI. February 2006, JPL 06-0932, https:// December 2020). 45 Casani OHI; Berger, “Cost Concerns trs.jpl.nasa.gov/handle/2014/39397; Temper Excitement”; JIMO Annual Report, Tibor Balint, et al., “Mission Architecture35 “House appropriations bill expected Options for a Near Term Small Europa to revive Pluto mission, Europa orbiter,” 2. Lander,” 27 March 2006, JPL 06-0829, Aviation Week’s AEROSPACE DAILY, 8 46 Casani OHI; Prometheus Project https://trs.jpl.nasa.gov/handle/2014/ October 2002, copy in NHD, HRC 10117. Final Report, 2-3, 190-91. 39393; Karla B. Clark, “Europa Explorer—An 36 Jason Davis, “And Then There was 47 See NASA Headquarters organiza- Exceptional Mission Using Existing One,” 11 October 2017, https://www.plan- tional charts for January and June 2004: Technology,” 3 March 2007, JPL 06-2857, etary.org/articles/20170918-cassini-then- https://history.nasa.gov/orgcharts/orgcharts. https://trs.jpl.nasa.gov/handle/2014/ there-was-one; William Harwood, “Mission html (accessed 16 December 2020). 40246 (all accessed 16 December 2020). Q U E S T 28:4 2021 30 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 31 53 Brian Berger, “Scientists Favor Small 14 February 2008, JPL 08-0298, https:// Svitak, “NASA Planetary Budget Casts Missions Over Costly NASA Flagships,” trs.jpl.nasa.gov/handle/2014/41643; Doubt on Europa Mission,” Space News, 3 Space News, 6 March 2006, https:// Robert E. Lock, Robert T. Pappalardo and March 2011, https://spacenews.com/ spacenews.com/scientists-favor-small-mis- Karla B. Clark, “Europa Explorer Operational nasa-planetary-budget-casts-doubt-europa- sions-over-costly-nasa-flagships/ (accessed Scenarios Development.” 2008, JPL 08-2009, mission/ and “NASA Budget Outlook 16 December 2020); Leonard David, “Angry h t t p s : / / t r s . j p l . n a s a . g ov / h a n d l e / Relegates Flagship Probes to Back Burner,” Scientists Confront NASA Officials,” Space 2014/45385; “Outer Planets Flagship Space News, 4 March 2011, https://space- News, 20 March 2006, copy in NHD, HRC Mission,” 28 August 2008, https://www.lpi. news.com/nasa-budget-outlook-relegates- 12910, also https://spacenews.com/ usra.edu/opag/archive_documents/ flagship-probes-back-burner/; Debra Werner, angry-scientists-confront-nasa-officials/ sg_opf_8_08.pdf (all accessed 16 “Juno May Be Last Chance To Obtain (accessed 16 December 2020); “There’s December 2020); Brown, The Mission, 179- Jupiter Data for a Decade,” Space News, 4 no money, but many ideas for seeking life 83; 202, 224-26. April 2011, https://spacenews.com/juno- on Europa,” Aviation Week’s AEROSPACE DAILY & DEFENSE REPORT, 29 March 59 Brown, The Mission, 183-96, 200- may-be-last-chance-obtain-jupiter-data- 2006, copy in NHD, HRC 10117. 202; Reh, “Overview”; “Outer Planets decade/ (all accessed 17 December 2020). Flagship Mission,”; OPF Study Team pres- 63 Green OHI; ESA, “JUICE: Exploring 54 Ibid.; Leonard David, “Texas entation to the OPAG Steering Committee, the emergence of habitable worlds Lawmaker Decries NASA Science Cuts,” Karla Clark, et al., “Return to Europa: around gas giants,” ESA/SRE(2011) 18 Space News, 6 April 2006, https:// Overview of the Jupiter Europa Orbiter December 2011, https://sci.esa.int/docu- spacenews.com/texas-lawmaker-decries- Mission,” c. early 2009, JPL 09-0123_A1b, ments/33960/35865/1567260128466- nasa-science-cuts/;Louis Friedman, “OpEd: https://trs.jpl.nasa.gov/handle/2014/45324; JUICE_Red_Book_i1.0.pdf; “L1 Mission Save Our Science—While Preserving the Karla Clark, et al., “Jupiter Europa Orbiter: Reformulation: JUICE—JUpiter ICy moons Vision,” Space News, 19 June 2006, Final Report,” 30 January 2009, Explorer: Technical & programmatic review https://spacenews.com/oped-save-our-sci- https://sci.esa.int/documents/34530/36042 report,” 18 December 2011, https://sci. ence-while-saving-vision/; Brian Berger, /1567259718883-JEO-Rpt_Public-Release esa.int/documents/33960/35865/ “House Appropriations Boosts Aeronautics, _090203.pdf (all accessed 16 December 1567258881195-JU ICE_techn ica l Science Funding,” Space News, 29 June 2020). _and_programmatic_review_report.pdf, 2006, https://spacenews.com/house- appropriations-boosts-aeronautics-science- 60 Brown, The Mission, 231-33; and “JUICE: JUpiter ICy moons Explorer: Jefferson Morris and Frank Morring, Jr., Exploring the emergence of habitablefunding/ (all accessed 16 December 2020). “Jupiter, Jointly,” Aviation Week & Space worlds around gas giants,” ESA/ 55 Pappalardo OHI, 28 October 2018; Technology, 20 February 2009, and Tariq SRE(2014)1, September 2014, https:// Robert Pappalardo, OHI by author and Malik, “Jupiter Probes Jump Ahead in s c i . e s a . i n t / d o c u m e n t s / 3 3 9 6 0 Matthew Shindell, Washington, DC, 10 Potential Mission Queue,” Space News, 23 /35865/1567260128466-JUICE_Red December 2018; Brown, The Mission, 15- February 2009, copies in NHD, HRC _Book_i1.0.pdf (all accessed 17 December 16; “Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 17567, latter also at https://spacenews. 2020). Between The California Institute of com/jupiter-probes-jump-ahead-potential- 64 Green OHI; Niebur OHI; Brown, The Technology, Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) mission-queue/ (accessed 20 September Mission, 263-86, 317-25; “Europa Study and The Johns Hopkins University, Applied 2020); Prockter OHI; Niebur OHI; Langmaier 2012 Report,” 1 May 2012, https:// Physics Laboratory (APL),” 15 September and Elliott, “Assessment,” who list all JPL europa.nasa.gov/resources/63/europa- 2006, copy courtesy of Robert Pappalardo; Europa studies to that date on 2-11. study-2012-report/, ES-5-ES-16, A-2, A-6-A- Charles Elachi, OHI by author, Pasadena, 61 Karla B. Clark presentation, 9 (quote, ES-16); “NASA Panel Briefed onCA, 15 May 2019; 10. “EJSM/Jupiter Europa Orbiter Design and Cheaper Europa Probes,” Space News, 8 56 James Green, OHI by author and Status,” 18 January 2010, JPL 10-0086, October 2012, https://spacenews.com/ Matthew Shindell, Washington, DC, 8 https://trs.jpl.nasa.gov/handle/2014/42227; 31544nasa-panel-briefed-on-cheaper- March 2019; Brown, The Mission, 91-92; Todd Bayer, et al., “Europa Mission Concept europa-probes/; Irene Klotz, “Clipper Ship “Europa mission likely to cost $2B-$4B, Studies: Early Formulation MBSE and for Europa Mission Listed as Scientists’ Top NASA tells Congress,” Aviation Week’s Lessons Learned,” 8 March 2012, JPL 11- Choice,” Space News, 14 December 2012, AEROSPACE DAILY & DEFENSE REPORT, 17 5457_A1b, https://trs.jpl.nasa.gov/handle https://spacenews.com/clipper-ship-for- March 2007, copy in NHD, HRC 17567. /2014/43522; NRC, Visions and Voyages europa-mission-listed-as-scientists-top-choice/ (all accessed 17 December 2020). 57 Niebur OHI. For more on the origins for Planetary Science in the Decade 2013- of the four-way competition see Brown, The 2022 (National Academies Press, 2011), 4 65 Niebur OHI; Prockter OHI; Mission, 87-95. (quote), 5-6, https://www.nap.edu/cata- Pappalardo OHI, 10 December 2018; Brianlog/13117/vision-and-voyages-for-plane- Cooke OHI by author, Pasadena, CA, 20 58 2007 Europa Explorer Mission tary-science-in-the-decade-2013-2022 (all May 2019; Dan Leone, “Europa Clipper Study: Final Report, November 2007, JPLA, accessed 16 December 2020); Pappalardo Would Wash Out Other Nuclear-powered D-41283; Robert Pappalardo and Karla OHI, 10 December 2018; Prockter OHI; Missions,” Space News, 28 July 2014, Clark presentation, “Europa Explorer: Brown, The Mission, 251-62. https://spacenews.com/41399europa- 2008 Study Approach,” February 2008, JPL 08-0587, https://trs.jpl.nasa.gov/han- 62 NRC, New Frontiers, 215-16 (2001 clipper-would-wash-out-other-nuclear-pow- ered-missions/, and Jeff Foust, “ Europa dle/ 2014/41392; Kim Reh, “Overview of statement of task); NRC, Visions and Clipper Opts for Solar Power over Nuclear,” 2008 Outer Planets Flagship Studies,” 13- Voyages, 318-321 (NASA 2008 request andc. 2009 statement of task); Green OHI; Amy 8 October 2014, https://spacenews.com Q U E S T 28:4 2021 31 www.spacehistory101.com quest-28-4-v2-neufeld-links_Layout 2 11/1/2021 8:18 PM Page 32 /42121europa-clipper-opts-for-solar-power- ence-instruments/ (accessed 17 December https://spacenews.com/inspector-general- over-nuclear/ (both accessed 17 December 2020); NASA IG-19-019, “Management,” 3- report-warns-of-cost-and-schedule-prob- 2020). For a detailed outline of the solar 4; Jason Callahan, “The end of an era in the lems-for-europa-clipper/, and “Cost growth decision, see Barry Goldstein and Robert exploration of Europa,” The Space Review, 12 prompts changes in Europa Clipper Pappalardo presentation to OPAG, “Europa November 2018, https://www.thespacere- Instruments,” Space News, 10 September Clipper Update,” 19 February 2015, view.com/article/3603/1/ (accessed 17 2020, https://spacenews.com/cost-growth- https://www.lpi.usra.edu/opag/meetings/ December 2020). prompts-changes-to-europa-clipper-instru- feb2015/presentations/04_Clipper%20OP AG%20Feb%202015.pdf (accessed 17 74 NASA IG-19-019, “Management,” 9; ments/; NASA Press Release, “Mission to Robert Pappalardo, et al., “Science Jupiter’s Icy Moon Confirmed,” 19 AugustDecember 2020). Potential from a Europa Lander,” 2019, https://europa.nasa.gov/news/25/ 66 Elachi OHI; Green OHI; Prockter OHI; Astrobiology 13 (2013), 740-71; Kevin mission-to-jupiters-icy-moon-confirmed/ (all Campbell OHI. Hand OHI by author and Matthew Shindell, accessed 17 December 2020). 67 Jason Callahan OHI by author and Washington, DC, 14 April 2019: “NASA 78 Harry Lambright, Why Mars: NASA Matthew Shindell, Washington, DC, 20 Maps Out Goals for Europa Landing,” and the Politics of Space Exploration November 2018; Pappalardo OHI, 10 Space News, 2 September 2013, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2014). On Mars December 2018; Prockter OHI; Elachi OHI. https://spacenews.com/37045nasa- exploration at JPL from late 1980s to themaps-out-goals-for-europa-landing/; Barry early 2000s, see Erik M. Conway, 68 Dan Leone, “NASA’s Europa Mission Goldstein and Robert Pappalardo presenta- Exploration and Engineering: The Jet Progresses on the Back Burner,” Space tion, “Europa Update,” 30 March 2016, Propulsion Laboratory and the Quest for News, 22 July 2013, https://spacenews. https://trs.jpl.nasa.gov/handle/2014/46537; Mars (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2015). com/36388nasas-europa-mission-con- Europa Lander Study 2016 Report, “Europa cept-progresses-on-the-back-burner/; Dan Lander Mission,” JPL D-97667. 10 August 79 Culberson OHI; Pappalardo OHI, 10 Leone, “NASA To Seek Ideas for $1 Billion 2017, https://europa.nasa.gov/resources December 2018. Mission to Europa,” Space News, 6 March /58/europa-lander-study-2016-report/; 80 Elachi OHI. 2014, https://spacenews.com/39756 Aline Zimmer, et al., presentation, “Early nasa-to-seek-ideas-for-1-billion-mission-to- 81 Callahan OHI; Elachi OHI. evolution of the mission architecture for europa/, (both accessed 17 December NASA’s Europa Lander concept,” June 82 Prockter OHI; Neufeld, “Transforming,” 2020); NASA Inspector General Report No. 2017, https://trs.jpl.nasa.gov/handle/2014 11; Neufeld, “First Mission,” 268-71. IG-19-019, “Management of NASA’s Europa /47997; Jeff Foust, “Europa lander concept 83 Elachi OHI. Mission,” 29 May 2019, https://oig. redesigned to lower cost and complexity,” nasa.gov/docs/IG-19-019.pdf (accessed Space News, 29 March 2018, https:// * * * 17 December 2020), 3; John Culberson spacenews.com/europa-lander-concept- OHI by author and Matthew Shindell, redesigned-to-lower-cost-and-complexity (all Washington, DC, 14 December 2018; accessed 17 December 2020). Green OHI. 75 NASA IG-19-019, “Management,” 69 Culberson OHI; Culberson profile in 11, 15-16; H.R.1158 -- Consolidated Brown, The Mission, 110-32. Appropriations Act, 2020, 16th Congress 70 Culberson OHI; Brown, The Mission, (2019-2020), 20 December 2019, https:// 326-32. www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ93/ PLAW-116publ93.pdf, see NASA Science 71 Culberson OHI. section, 100 (accessed 17 December 2020). 72 Green OHI; Lorenz Roth, et al., 76 Jeff Foust, “NASA inspector general “Transient Water Vapor at Europa’s South asks Congress for Europa Clipper launch Pole,” Science 343 (2014), 171-74 (online flexibility,”Space News, 28 August 2019, 12 December 2013); Green presentation to https://spacenews.com/nasa-inspector- Strategic Integration Planning meeting, general-asks-congress-for-europa-clipper- “Europa Exploration,” 20 February 2014, launch-flexibility/; Jeff Foust, “Compatibility copy courtesy James Green; Jay R. issue adds new wrinkle to Europa Clipper Thompson, “The Moon with the Plume” launch vehicle selection,” Space News, (about Enceladus), 12 April 2017, https:// 18 August 2020, https://spacenews.com/ solarsystem.nasa.gov/news/13020/the- compatibility-issue-adds-new-wrinkle-to- moon-with-the-plume/ (accessed 17 europa-clipper-launch-vehicle-selection/; December 2020); NASA IG-19-019, Jeff Foust, “NASA to use commercial launch “Management,” 3; Brown, The Mission, vehicle for Europa Clipper,” 10 February 337-43. 2021, https://spacenews.com/nasa-to-use 73 NASA Press Release, 26 May 2015, -commercial-launch-vehicle-for-europa-clip- “NASA’s Europa Mission Begins with per/ (all accessed 16 July 2021). Selection of Scientific Instruments,” 77 “Inspector general report warns of https://europa.nasa.gov/news/4/nasas- cost and schedule problems for Europa europa-mission-begins-with-selection-of-sci- Clipper,” Space News, 29 May 2019, Q U E S T 28:4 2021 32 www.spacehistory101.com www.SpaceHistory101.com Published since 1992, Quest is the only peer-reviewed journal Mailing Address exclusively focused on preserving the history of spaceflight. Quest P.O. Box 5752 Each 64-page issue features the people, programs, and politics Bethesda, MD 20824-5752 that made the journey into space possible. United States Tel:  +1 (703) 524-2766 quest@spacehistory101.com Written by professional and amateur historians, astronauts, and people who worked on the programs. Publisher: Scott Sacknoff Editor: Dr. Christopher Gainor Featuring stories and behind-the-scenes insight that will fascinate, captivate, and educate Yes, I Want to Help Preserve the History of the Space! ISSN: 1065-7738 Please send me the next: __ 4 issues (1 year) or __ 8 issues (2 years) of Quest! Name: _____________________________________________________________ United States Address: ___________________________________________________________ 4 issues / 1 Year:   $29.95 City: _______________________________________________________________ 8 issues / 2 Years:  $50.00 State: ______________________________________________________________ Zip: ___________________ Country: __________________________________ Canada / Mexico Phone: ____________________________ 4 issues / 1 Year:   $34.95 8 issues / 2 Years:  $65.00 E-mail: _____________________________ Outside North America ___ I’ve enclosed a check*. ____ Please charge my credit card. 4 issues / 1 Year:   $44.95 Credit Card #: _______________________________________________________ 8 issues / 2 Years:  $75.00 Exp Date: ________ CVV _________ Signature: __________________________________________________________ * In U.S. dollars drawn on a U.S. bank