ants in Panama, and tin miners in Bolivia—I would agree emphatically but would go on to say that this point has long since been demonstrated, for example in Malinowski’s brilliant chapters 11 and 12 in Coral Gardens, where he explains the folk-meaning of land tenure to the Trobriand Islanders, its derivation from myths of origin, its connection to lineage organization, and its expression in uriguba payments to married sisters; also by Max Gluckman’s excellent presentation of the folk-explanation of what it means for the Lozi king to “own” the land; and by Evans-Pritchard’s folk-explanation of what cattle mean to the Nuer.

There are two basic confusions in what Gudeman says, which I think destroy his central argument. First, because Marxism, formalism, and substantivism result in explanatory conclusions different from folk-views and not contained in folk-views, he thinks folk-views are “right” and Marxism, formalism, and substantivism are “wrong.” But analytical statements made by the anthropologist are almost always different from folk-views. We do not dismiss Evans-Pritchard’s explanatory statement that Nuer political alignments may be called “segmentary opposition” because the Nuer people do not themselves use that phrase, or, in their own language, have that concept. Gudeman seems not to understand that analytical statements (formalism, Marxism, or substantivism) and presentation of folk-views are both necessary. They are not the same thing and they are not substitutes for one another.

Secondly, despite his dismissal of them, Gudeman himself implicitly calls for such explanatory models different from folk-views. Pages 35–37 contain Gudeman’s list of five questions economic anthropologists should try to answer in their analysis of actual economies of time and place, an agenda, incidentally, quite compatible with Polanyi’s substantivism. The first three questions are about distribution of goods produced, production, and consumption. The final two questions to be answered, as Gudeman himself here almost recognizes, must employ some sort of larger theory stated in analytical terms, not folk-terms, to be answered persuasively. Note that Gudeman is here expressing dissatisfaction with the explanatory models of Marx and Polanyi but is not himself suggesting a superior theory to answer these questions.

Fourth, how can we talk about the relation between economic practices and social organization? Polanyi held that the economy may be variously embedded in the social or—der; reciprocity is closely linked to ties of kinship, while redistribution is a feature of political relationships. A Marxist view of the same issue would be formulated in terms of the “social relations of production” and determination by the “base.” But are these the best terms for discussing the connections between socially defined morality and material actions?

Finally, how should we conceive the total configuration of a people’s economic practices? . . . The problems are evident yet are there anthropological ways of specifying an economy as totality? [pp. 35–37]

The answers to both questions require explanatory models using conceptual terms different from folk-views.


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This book presents an alternative approach to the comparative analysis of economies by anthropologists. As the title implies, it argues for a more structural interpretation of an economy as a reflection of a culture. Its premise is that using economic models developed to isolate the critical processes that drive a Western economy fundamentally distorts the actual system as developed and known by both Western and non-Western actors. A people’s understanding of the world, and their interaction with it, is the key to the major components and forces in their economic system.

Models and metaphors, Gudeman suggests, are not transcripts of reality; they construct reality. Both use certain key features in order to explain a situation. In a metaphor, the relations among the parts of a phenomenon are seen as similar to those of another, more basic, phenomenon. Western economic models establish core features such as limited means and multiple goals, labor-added value, or the dominant form of exchange, which are viewed as causal. Depending upon the fit of independently collected data, a model is either validated, altered, or rejected. However, Gudeman dwells little on the implications of the last two possibilities.

This approach is illustrated by several economies and local models in Panama, Africa, Melanesia, Borneo, Canada, and Bolivia as well as the economic models of the Physi-
ocrates and David Ricardo. Among the Bemba, for example, the moods of the ancestors are believed to control the forces of the environment and, therefore, ancestor propitiation is the means for providing an abundant harvest. The ancestors also dominate the social order by the social attribution of greater prestige to those genealogically closest to them. The relations of production, distribution, and consumption reflect this hierarchy and theory of causality. Therefore the entire system is reflexive and coherent, and focused more on the circulation of goods than on their production. Whether this last point should be completely believed is another question. Gudeman does not literally accept the Bemba assertion that the ancestors control the world, but he does abstract from it a model of the principles upon which Bemba society and economy are based.

One might expect this kind of approach to have an inescapable relativism. However, Gudeman avoids this by showing that there are themes central to human experience which recur as metaphors cross-culturally and that these provide a basis upon which to invoke comparisons. The result is a more culture-sensitive way of classifying economies in which the central metaphor is, for example, an identification constructed between a social group and its major subsistence crop, or an exchange relationship between the self and either closely related or distantly related others.

By virtue of the static models described (possibly attributable in some cases to ahistorical ethnography), this form of analysis only allows for change from without. In the Panamanian example, the existence of a larger economic system, of which the locals have little knowledge, brings changes into their system which cause the people to evolve through three different economic models. However, for development anthropology, Gudeman suggests that the local economic model will have a strong effect on the acceptance of imposed changes.

Although it claims to reject empiricism (pp. 32–33), the book also asserts that patterns will gradually emerge from continued comparisons (p. 43). Some empiricism, along with close attention to the theories of both the actors and various observers, is preferable in most kinds of anthropology. This book advocates one of these at the expense of the others. Nevertheless, it is an important and innovative book which clearly presents the argument that models of production, distribution, etc., offered by particular peoples are crucial to an understanding of their economies.


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These two anthologies, analyzing a wide range of societies throughout the world, present two sides of the coin in capitalist penetration. The book edited by Norman Long emphasizes the techniques of resistance to capitalist values and institutions, the second, edited by Haleh Afshar, concerns the transformation brought about in the wake of capitalist development. Both deal with the interplay of ideological and sociocultural aspects of the changes in ways that enhance our understanding not only of development processes but of basic social institutions.

Norman Long provides a comprehensive introduction to his collection of essays that range from small peasant households in Egypt, cash crop production and family labor in Argentina, household cooperation in the Andes, family farms in Finland, Poland, England, and Iceland, and the organization of labor in an Israeli kibbutz. Rejecting a view of cooperative and nonpaid work as a transitional form from precapitalist to fully capitalized institutions, he analyzes such forms as a structure with an internal logic. The process of restructuring is not, as he shows, predictive from the economic setting alone, but must take into account the "internal reproductive processes." The reformulation of the problem then becomes: How do the norms of nonwage, noncapitalist forms resist penetration of commodity relations or transform them in accordance with existing noncapitalist principles? Extolling Bourque and Warren's linkage of social ideologies and the material conditions of production, Long calls for analyses that take fully into account the specific sexual division of labor, types of marriage contract, and power relations in noncapitalist social relations of production.

The book is organized in relation to three themes: (1) factors that promote or inhibit the persistence of peasant forms of organization and family, (2) interhousehold exchanges and community-level patterns of cooperation, and (3) changing roles of women within the division of labor. Each of the contributions focuses on the interplay of structural imperatives and