indispensable source for students of Vietnam, the Cold War, and twentieth-century world history for many years to come.

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Ralph L. Dietl has provided a deeply researched account of the European responses to the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations during the Nixon and Ford administrations. Dietl makes use of a trove of recently declassified sources in the European archives as well as those in the United States and Russia to analyze European attempts to influence the negotiations between the superpowers over the SALT process.

While the Soviets wanted European and North Atlantic Treaty Association (NATO) arms to be included as part of the limits assigned to the American side of the negotiations for nuclear parity, the Europeans insisted that they should not be subject to negotiations in which they were unrepresented. They feared that the SALT negotiations might lead to an uncoupling of U.S. and European security because in conditions of nuclear parity the Americans would be unwilling to launch a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union in response to a limited invasion of Europe, knowing that the Soviets could respond by destroying the United States. The Europeans counted on readiness for early first use of nuclear weapons and for this first use to be a massive attack on Soviet nuclear forces in the Soviet Union rather than a limited strike on the invading forces, which would leave the continent devastated. Of course, the Europeans did not want to fight a nuclear war any more than a limited war but assumed that a demonstrated willingness to do so would serve as a deterrent to any sort of war.

By and large, Henry Kissinger and the other American SALT negotiators accommodated European concerns even if they did not consult NATO as much as the Europeans wished. They avoided clauses that would prohibit transfer of nuclear arms to the NATO allies. They ensured that pledges against the use of nuclear weapons contained in SALT did not apply in case of aggression of any sort. They refused to count British and French missiles against the American quota, although Kissinger was willing to accept a Soviet advantage in missiles or throw weight to compensate for American advantages in other areas, implicitly including European arms.

This was not enough for some Europeans and certainly not for Dietl. Dietl insists that an agreement such as SALT II that approached nuclear parity between the Western allies and the Soviet Union would decouple the U.S. defense from Europe because without nuclear superiority the United States would be unwilling to make a nuclear strike on the Soviets in response to a conventional invasion of Europe. Thus, Kissinger is the villain of this piece while the heroes are the Europeans along with Washington senator Henry M. Jackson, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and other Americans who demanded exact U.S. parity with the Soviets and therefore bloc superiority when the Europeans were included on the American side.

Dietl makes intrinsically complex issues even more impenetrable with ponderous prose and the convoluted paraphrasing of his documents, but overall this is a very valuable contribution to the history of Cold War arms control.

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**No Requiem for the Space Age: The Apollo Moon Landings and American Culture.** By Matthew D. Tribbe. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. xii, 276 pp. $34.95.)

In July 1969 an estimated 123 million Americans watched thirty hours of nonstop television coverage of the lunar landing and the first steps on the moon. For Walter Cronkite, as for many Americans, it was an emotional experience. At the moment of touchdown the
ever-articulate interpreter of world events for a generation of Americans was reduced to a few reverential, “oh boys” (p. 27). President Richard M. Nixon described his chat with the first two astronauts standing on the moon as “the most historic phone call ever made.” “The eight days of Apollo,” he declared, was “the greatest week in the history of the world since the Creation” (p. 6).

Forty-five years after Apollo 11, the voyages to the moon continue to hold an honored place in American’s collective memory, but the legacy of the lunar voyages is less certain. After defeating the Soviet Union in the race to the moon on the promised timetable, a lack of enthusiasm from both Congress and the public led to serious reductions in the budget of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the cancellation of the final three planned Apollo moon missions. Robot exploration of the moon and planets flourished, but there would be no more astronaut visits or longer human voyages to the planets. The next generation of spacecraft enabled construction of the space station but confined operations to low-earth orbit. With the retirement of the space shuttle program, American astronauts now fly into space aboard Russian craft.

Why did the United States send people to the moon, and what did it mean? Matthew D. Tribble notes that writers as varied as Norman Mailer, Kurt Vonnegut, and Oriana Fallaci struggled with those questions. The justification of the effort seemed clear to Neil Armstrong: “I think we’re going to the moon because it’s in the nature of the human being to face challenges . . . to do these things just as salmon swim upstream” (p. 68). Others disagreed. For Lewis Mumford, Paul Tillich, Hannah Arendt, and Loren Eiseley, the author explains, “Apollo became a prime symbol of a twentieth-century technocratic-rationalist culture . . . ‘a master’s of the universe’ mindset—with which many were growing uneasy” (p. 69).

Why has it been so difficult to identify the fundamental meaning of the lunar landings? “Apollo was of a specific historical moment,” the author explains, “and that moment began to pass even before the moon program completed its run in the early 1970s” (p. 219). The currents of American culture, he argues, were shifting. The era of rationalist faith in the power of science and technology, harnessed by big government, to effect positive change was giving way to a period marked by a reaction against technocratic trends, an increasing pessimism, a loss of faith in government, and a vanishing sense of unified national purpose. “That moon flights are not of paramount importance today, and have not been since the demise of Apollo in the wake of the neo-romantic surge at the turn of the 1970s,” he concludes, “emphasizes . . . the turn away from the rationalist vision of progress that reached its peak with the Space Age, only to burn out spectacularly along with the flames of Apollo” (p. 227).

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The Folklore of the Freeway: Race and Revolt in the Modernist City. By Eric Avila. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014. xii, 228 pp. Cloth, $75.00. Paper, $24.95.)

In this cultural history of freeway construction, Eric Avila examines how urban communities responded to the devastation wrought by the interstate highway program that emerged in the 1950s. A centerpiece of modernist city planning, the interstate system was the largest public works project in American history, funding the construction of a 42,800-mile highway network that transformed metropolitan America according to planners’ visions of efficiency, rationality, and progress. It should come as no surprise that the massive project created enemies. As freeways cut through cities, demolished hundreds of thousands of homes, and destroyed communities, a “freeway revolt” of urban residents emerged in response, most famously in the successful struggle of the activist and author Jane Jacobs to save Greenwich Village from the highway-building schemes of Robert Moses.