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THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SOME HINTS TOWARD ITS REFORM¹

BY ANDREW D. WHITE, LL.D., D.C.L.

REGENT OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, SOMETIME PRESIDENT OF CORNELL
UNIVERSITY, MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY AT ST. PETERSBURG
AND AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN

Remarks of Mr. S. P. Langley, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, introducing Doctor White.

A number of years ago Mr. James Hamilton left a small bequest to the Smithsonian Institution, the income of which was to be "appropriated biennially by the secretaries, either in money or a medal, for such contribution, paper, or lecture on any scientific or useful subject as said secretaries may approve."

The Regents of the Institution decided to let this small sum accumulate, and it is only recently that the Secretary has found himself able to commence to employ the income as a lecture fund.

The lectures may be on any scientific or useful subject, but surely no subject is more useful or important than that which tends to promote a general peace among mankind, and I am fortunate in being able to present to you to-day one who can speak with authority on the diplomatic service of our country, which has at all times signally and successfully aided in promoting this great object of the peace of the world.

I have now particular pleasure in introducing to you as the first lecturer in the series one whose name is so prominent in these annals of American diplomacy, as that of the Honorable Andrew D. White.

Mr. President, Ladies, and Gentlemen:

Some years since, a very eminent American journalist, in discussing our diplomatic service, proposed what he was pleased to

¹An address delivered before the Smithsonian Institution at Washington, March 9, 1905.

call "a reform." His plan was exceedingly drastic. For it was nothing less than that the entire existing system be extirpated, root and branch,—in fact, "reformed off the face of the earth," and that in place of it, whenever our Government should have any business with any other, it should seek out a suitable agent, make a fair bargain with him for his services, send him to attend to the matter, and then recall him as soon as he had finished it.

Although this advice has often been cited as a piece of political wisdom, has lingered vaguely in the public mind, and has, indeed, been recently sanctioned by a very eminent American citizen, it seems not difficult to show that such a departure from the practice of the whole civilized world would be a misfortune,—not only to our country in general, but especially to our political, commercial and financial interests; that our guiding idea in any reform of the diplomatic service, as in every other true reform, should be, not revolution but evolution; not an adoption of the idea dear to so many so-called reformers, that "whatever is wrong," but the recognition in our existing system of what is good, and the development out of this, by simple common sense and statesmanlike methods, of something better.

For, in view of all the interests of our country, ever extending, ever becoming more complex, ever demanding, more and more, quick sight and prompt action, what is it that we need? Is it men to be sought and selected and passed upon and haggled with and sent across the ocean to see if, perhaps, they can mitigate serious and even disastrous international trouble after it has got under full headway? Is it not, rather, to have thoroughly trained men on the spot, who shall foresee trouble, prevent it, attenuate it, disperse it, be in touch with the right men, know the right means, speak the right word, at the right moment, in the right quarter?

Some years since, at Constantinople, I asked the cause of the widespread conflagrations which had so often devastated that capital. The answer was that the city had a very peculiar fire department—that when a fire broke out in any house, the proper and usual way was for its owner to seek someone who owned a hand fire engine, to find, by proper examination, whether he was trustworthy, whether his helpers were robust, whether his fire apparatus was effective; and then to make a bargain with him and his helpers and conduct them to the fire. There was usually, so I was informed, not much trouble in finding the fire, for, by the time the machine had been approved and the firemen selected and bargained with and got to the spot, the conflagration was amply evident.

Whether this alleged method really existed or not among the Turks, it is certainly the sort of thing contemplated in the proposal I have just mentioned, regarding the beginnings of international conflagrations.

As a matter of historical fact, this system of special and temporary diplomatic agents was fully tried during the Middle Ages, with the result that for hundreds of years Europe was furrowed and harrowed with perpetual war, whereas the modern system, with all its defects, has come into existence by an evolution due to the environment of an ever increasing civilization, has certainly prevented very many germs of international trouble from developing, and has given the world long periods of peace.

Many examples might be mentioned, showing what can be done by the right man, saying the right word, at the right time, and in the right place, but I will remind you of just one, well known, as typical—that of Mr. Charles Francis Adams, our Minister to Great Britain during the most trying period of our Civil War. He was a very capable man, and was especially known as a very cool man. You may remember that one very hot summer, in Kansas, when great injury was done to cattle and crops by drought, various newspapers proposed that he should be sent for and asked to travel through the State in order to reduce its temperature.

A crisis had come in the relations of the United States and Great Britain. It looked much as if a number of additional cruisers, nominally American but really British, were to be let loose to prey upon our commerce. The British Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time was Earl Russell, a man whom Carlyle would have called "a solemnly constituted impostor"; and as he had not prevented the sailing of the previous cruisers, it did not seem likely that he would prevent the sailing of these. But, just as they were ready to depart on their mission of devastation, Mr. Adams wrote Earl Russell, stated the case very simply, and used these memorable words, "It would be superfluous in me to point out to your lordship that this is war."

This cool, plain, straightforward statement, made in the right manner, to the right man, at the right moment, stopped the cruisers, and war was prevented—immensely to the advantage of American commerce and of all the interests of our country.

For, of all the calamities to the world which one can imagine, there can hardly be anything more fearful than a war between the two great English speaking nations. Indeed, nothing could be worse, unless it were the relinquishment of international righteous-

ness, or the sacrifice of the just position of our country, or of the self-respect of its citizens.

A special reason for the maintenance of an organized diplomatic service is found in the need of making or modifying treaties. Here it is that a minister permanently residing at a foreign court has a decided advantage. He notes the progress of affairs, watches for opportunities, makes the acquaintance of statesmen and other men of influence in the country to which he is accredited, and is thus able to suggest and to secure treaties and modifications of treaties much earlier and more easily than could possibly be done from the center of a distant government. Even if special commissioners be sent to make a treaty, a resident representative is sure to be of the utmost value.

An excellent example is seen in the late George Bancroft during his career as Minister of the United States at Berlin—a career which lasted about eight years.

Up to his time, Germans who had become American citizens and afterward revisited their own country were constantly liable to arrest or annoyance with reference to their military and other duties to the country of their birth: there was then a frequent assertion in all parts of Europe of the old principle, "once a subject, always a subject," and the result was very great hardship to large numbers of worthy men, great distress to many families, and constant danger of hostile relations between our own country and various German states; relations which might have resulted in serious injury to our manufactures and commerce, costing us in a few months a far greater sum than our diplomatic establishment would cost in many years.

In the struggle between Prussia and Austria, which led to the establishment of the North German Confederation, and in the resultant desire of Prussia for a friendly attitude of the United States, Mr. Bancroft saw his opportunity. He secured with much labor and skill, concessions which at any other time would have been withheld. The German government maintained that permission to German-Americans to return and remain in Germany had led to a wretched prostitution of American citizenship; that great numbers of young men, just about arriving at the military age, had no sooner been naturalized in the United States than they hurried back to their fatherland, claiming the privileges of both countries, but discharging the duties of neither. In the treaties now obtained, the right of the former subjects of various German states naturalized in our own country to revisit the place of their birth, was defined, and most

favorably to them. As a rule, they were allowed to return to the German Confederation freely and to remain there for two years, with the understanding that they should then make choice between the country of their birth and the country of their adoption. The whole system was thus made perfectly intelligible, preventing any further trouble, so long as Germany remained what it then was. Still more than that, as the great war between Germany and France drew on, Mr. Bancroft, being still on the ground, watching public affairs, saw that here was the opportunity to extend the treaties still further. This he did, and at last brought them upon an admirable footing, laying the foundations for permanent good will between the new Empire and the United States. He did this as no one could have done it without his experience in public affairs generally, and in German affairs specially, and certainly as no one could have done it unless upon the ground, carefully watching the progress of events, and skillfully making the most of them in behalf of his country. I may say, in passing, that the most amazing *tour de force* in his negotiations was his persuading both Prince Bismarck and himself that one basis of his claim for a better treaty was a striking similarity between the new constitution of the North German Confederation and the constitution of the United States. Never was a conviction less founded or more opportune.

Still another advantage of having a resident representative is that of creating an atmosphere in which the germs of international trouble are kept from developing, and in which troublesome questions between his own nation and that to which he is accredited may be easily settled. The French have a well-worn proverb, but a proverb which wears as well to-day as ever: "Absent people are always in the wrong." ("*Les absents ont toujours tort.*") English speaking peoples have another, much to the same effect: "The man I don't like is the man I don't know."

A representative of the United States, fitted for his place, at any important capital, finds, at various receptions, evening gatherings, festivities, official and unofficial, the ministers and leading men in the Government to which he is accredited, men of influence in executive departments, in parliament, in the press, and in social circles; and in this atmosphere learns beforehand of matters likely to create trouble, and is able to avert difficulty. By a word in the proper quarter, he can thus easily take the life out of whole flocks of *canards* let loose into the political atmosphere by men engaged in stock-jobbing or sensation mongering. So, too, a minister frequently receives, from this friend in public service or that friend in society,

hints regarding questions likely to arise, or information which it is desirable to have, in the interest of his own country.

Among typical examples of men who have served our country admirably in this way, in days gone by, are such as Elihu B. Washburne at Paris during the most critical moments of the Franco-Prussian War, the Invasion, and the Commune.

Typical also, in a very different way, was George P. Marsh, first at Constantinople, and afterward in Italy, at the formation period of the present Italian kingdom. In his quiet way, he prevented no end of difficulties, first throughout the Levant and later along the whole Northern coast of the Mediterranean.

Mention may also here be made of the late Henry Shelton Sanford. Though a minister to one of the smaller European powers, he became one of Secretary Seward's most valuable representatives in Europe during our Civil War, and did much, both by direct political and by well arranged social means, to ascertain the tendency of leading European statesmen and to influence them favorably toward American ideas and interests during that most critical period.

It is in this field that the statesmanship of Great Britain has shown its wisdom. Our mother country has by no means been a popular nation in the world. She seems to have preferred the respect of the world to its love; she has been at times too aggressive to be pleasing; but no one can deny that the way in which that little group of islands has baffled great despots like Louis XIV., Napoleon, and Nicholas I., has brought hundreds of millions beneath its sway, and has stretched its sceptre over every continent, without giving up its own constitutional liberty, is one of the wonderful things in human history. Whether we like it or not, we cannot but respect it. Yet a main factor in the accomplishment of this result is found not merely in the fleets and armies of Great Britain, but in the common sense of her diplomacy. As a rule, she has taken pains to send thoroughly fitted men into important diplomatic positions and to keep them there as long as they have done well. More than this, she has supplied them with the means to do their work: she has not stinted them; and the common sense of the English people is seen in the fact that at the great capitals of the world where her influence is to be exercised, she has always a large, commodious, and attractive residence for her representative, and makes his remuneration such that he can afford to devote all his thoughts to her interests. The demagogue may denounce this sort of thing; the doctrinaire may pooh-pooh it; but the fact remains that humanity,

as it is really constituted, is largely influenced in what are known as social ways, and for these Great Britain has always made abundant provision. Her embassy or legation in every capital of the world is a center, and generally a most influential center. Men may declaim against her; may even detest her, but, none the less, in every capital her embassy or legation stands as a power, social, and, largely on that account, political.

Another duty of our foreign representatives is the collection of information bearing on large questions important to our country. Of this information, that which relates to the actions of foreign powers in anticipated crises is frequently of the utmost importance. Grant that our diplomats have not the prophetic gift, still at every time since the formation of this Government, and never more than now, it has been of great importance to this country, politically and commercially, to have, at various centers of information throughout the world, thinking men with access to the best sources of news, who can constantly keep the home government advised as to the probable action of foreign powers. At this moment, when Europe is one great group of fortified camps, and great changes are taking place in Asia and Africa, and troublesome questions are arising in South America, it cannot but be of immense value to our manufacturing, commercial, and indeed all other interests to have the best and most recent information regarding the outcome of warlike operations, the drift of public opinion, and settlements likely to be made; and such information is obtained by our representatives at the lesser capitals almost as frequently as at the greater.

Then, too, there are other subjects of importance. Every year our State Department issues sundry volumes entitled "Diplomatic Relations." These are made up of selections from the dispatches of our representatives abroad. Among these are found not only dispatches on current international business, but valuable reports on leading subjects of public interest; and of these I may mention, in recent times, reports on systems of finance in foreign countries; on their supply and management of the circulating medium; on the administration of cities; on government railway systems; on public museums; on educational institutions; and the like. It may be said that the newspapers and magazines give us these; but the difficulty is that information thus supplied is too frequently sketchy and scrappy. I do not underrate the newspaper correspondent; he is one of the wonders of the world; but, after all, the diplomatic representative has certain decided advantages: he has easy access to men controlling every sort of institution, he can ask for interviews,

information, documents and the like with every probability of obtaining them, and this is not the case with the great majority of unofficial persons.

The social intercourse to which I have referred also affords a special means of casually obtaining important facts which one outside the diplomatic circle cannot reach.

The "Diplomatic Relations of the United States" are a great depository of information of all sorts, and are becoming more and more valuable. In proof of this assertion I would gladly refer to the despatches of many recently or at present in active diplomatic life; but, as that might seem invidious, I may at least say that a large number of them are models of wise observation, clear statement, and cogent reasoning. Any one looking over the main dispatches of our representatives abroad will see that their positions are not mere sinecures, but full of earnest and lucid thought for the highest interests of their country.

Another duty of a foreign representative of our country is to protect Americans within the country to which he is accredited. No doubt there are many in our own land who care little for this: it is very easy to say in an off-hand way, that if people go abroad as missionaries or for business, health or pleasure, they must take their chances; but as civilization has developed there has been evolved a better feeling which I trust may become deep and permanent throughout the country, and that is, that our citizens are to be fully protected in all parts of the world, at any cost. The famous boast "I am a Roman citizen," which was the passport and armor of the Roman in any part of the world, gives the idea of what ought to be the claim of the American citizen. Our own history in this respect has at times been creditable to us, but here, too, our mother country sets the world an example. Let any British subject in any part of the world be maltreated, and immediately it is a matter of interest to the home government. The resident minister feels himself false to his duty, or, if he does not feel so, knows that he will surely be denounced by the press and in Parliament, if he be remiss in securing redress for any wrong thus committed.

The most striking example of this, which now occurs to me, took place in the early part of this century in Lower Italy. An English gentleman and his wife were on their way from Naples to the ruins of Paestum. Having stopped over night at a town on the way, they took from their traveling carriage a dressing case in which the utensils were of silver, and this fact having been communicated from the servants at the inn to the neighboring brigands, these robbers on

the following day stopped the Englishman's carriage and demanded his "silver chest." The Englishman did not at first know what was meant, but presently it occurred to him, and he stooped to take out the case and hand it to the brigands; when, thinking that he was stooping to get his weapons, they fired into his carriage, killing him and his wife. Many countries would have contented themselves with the profuse palaver with which the Neapolitan Government tried to cover the matter, but such was not the case with the government of Great Britain. Not long afterward a frigate bearing the British flag sailed into the harbor of Naples, and the British minister made a formal demand. The immediate result was that eighteen brigands were hanged and the final result was that for a long time afterward, whomever brigands along the Mediterranean might murder, they very carefully spared Englishmen.

But here I wish to do what is possible for me, toward putting to rest a calumny against our own country as to the protection of her adopted citizens abroad. It has not infrequently been stated that Great Britain and various other countries are more careful in guarding the interests of their adopted citizens than is the case with our own Government. The very contrary is the truth. The rule in most, if not all, other countries, and especially in Great Britain, is to protect the interests of their adopted citizens in all other countries save that of their birth; but to leave them, when visiting their native country, to the tender mercies of that country. The rule of Great Britain is that when a naturalized subject visits the land of his birth, he does so at his own risk and peril. The American Government, on the other hand, exerts itself to the utmost to protect its adopted citizens in the land of their birth. Our country has taken the greatest possible pains to make careful treaties for this purpose, and in nothing has she been more constantly strenuous than in seeing that there be no infraction of such treaties. For many years it seemed to be the main business of American representatives abroad to struggle for the interests of our adopted citizens against every possible construction of treaties which might in any way curtail their interests. Any person looking at what are known as the "budget dispatches" from our embassies abroad will see most ample proofs of this.

And here a tribute ought not to be omitted to our recent and, indeed, present Ministers to Turkey and China:—a long series of them in both these regions have done their duty nobly.

Still another of the functions of an American diplomatic representative is to cooperate with the consuls of his government, promot-

ing by all honorable means the interests of American agriculture, manufactures, and commerce. The value of this kind of service was amply shown by the late Townsend Harris, in Japan. Having been sent to that country by President Peirce and Secretary Marcy, as Consul General, he was afterward given the powers of a special envoy, and finally promoted to the position of a Minister Resident. To him, more than to any other man, is due the opening of Japan to the commerce of America and of the world. His high character and skill inspired a confidence which enabled him to make that great treaty which marks a new point of departure in modern civilization. The value of the diplomatic service to commerce was also shown more recently by the successful efforts of our ministers, Mr. Reid at Paris and Mr. Phelps at Berlin, in breaking the European barriers hitherto maintained against some of the principal products of American agriculture.

And, finally, perhaps the highest incidental work in which a diplomatist can engage is the development of international law.

The Law of Nations is not made; it grows,—and in many ways; among others, by the labors of men employed in making treaties, or in conducting negotiations between different governments. The development of international law since the great work of Grotius in the seventeenth century is one of the noblest things in human history. In no field, perhaps, has so much been done to diminish unmerited suffering. Among those who have taken noble part in it are such as Franklin, Jefferson, John Adams, Jay, and, in more recent times, Wheaton, Dana, Lawrence, Bancroft, and Schenck. Of these, Henry Wheaton, who represented the United States from 1827 to 1846 at Copenhagen and Berlin deserves special mention. His works on International Law have become classics,—held in high honor at Oxford and Cambridge, at Paris and London, and even at Peking, where his principal work has received the honor of a Chinese translation.

Nor is this good development by any means ended. It may be within the power of any diplomatist, at any time, to exert a controlling influence in favor of arbitration between states which might otherwise be plunged into war, and thus to promote the substitution of arbitration for war in the gradually strengthening code of International Law.

And there is yet another great principle to be pressed upon the world, and an especially American principle. I refer to the exemption from seizures on the high seas of private property, not contraband of war. This is one of those great, steady, efforts for the

evolution of right reason, of mercy, and of a higher civilization which has been urged by American diplomatists steadily and on every possible occasion, from the days of our famous treaty with Frederick the Great, down to these times, when the American Delegation at the Hague Peace Conference has secured a place for discussion of this great subject on the programme of the next general conference of the civilized world.

In view of these great possibilities for a better future to the various nations and to universal humanity, there is no more promising field for fruitful effort than the American diplomatic service;—when it shall have been properly reorganized.

Hence it is, especially, that every thinking lover of his country must look with longing to the day when there shall be in all our leading universities young men in training for that service.

The first argument of those who declaim against any permanent diplomatic service or who would keep it in its present state of arrested development is that it is costly. But I think that you will see in it, really, “the cheap defense of nations.” The loss by a misunderstanding, which would bring injury upon American commerce, or by a failure to secure speedy information which would enable us to protect our interests in a foreign war, might be greater than the cost of our diplomatic establishment for many years. The loss by a war, which might have been averted by a well trained diplomatist on the ground, might be far more than enough to maintain the whole diplomatic corps of the United States for decades if not for centuries.

As a matter of fact, the entire annual appropriation for the diplomatic service of the United States during each of several recent years has been about \$500,000, but the cost of military and naval operations during our Civil War was, to the United States, between one and two millions for each day. The cost of military operations during the Franco-Prussian War, if divided equally between the two nations, would have amounted each day, for each, to considerably more than \$3,000,000. It is clear then that, even if war, with all its improved methods, should cost no more than it did thirty years ago,—which is a decidedly violent supposition,—the entire expenditure for our diplomatic corps for one year would be only about the expenditure for war during four hours; and if, which may Heaven forbid, we should be so unfortunate as to have a war break out with any foreign power, our diplomatic service would pay for itself during about six years, if it shortened the war by a single day. It is altogether probable that Mr. Charles Francis Adams, by his timely words to Earl Russell, prevented a prolongation of

our Civil War, which would have cost us more than the entire diplomatic service during centuries.*

It is also urged that residence abroad makes men "un-American." This is one of those vague charges to which a thinking man will generally attribute little importance. But even if there were some truth in it, as regards an ill balanced individual here and there, there can be set against it a more than countervailing advantage, which is, that our diplomatic service sends abroad, for a term of years, citizens from various parts of the country, who, after discharging their duties abroad, return with valuable experience to various stations at home—some like the Adamses, Jefferson, Monroe, Van Buren, and Buchanan, carrying their experience into the Chief Magistracy; some, like those just named, and Marshall, Clay, McLane, Forsythe, Legaré, Everett, Cass, Bayard, Foster, and Hay, into the Secretaryship of State; some into other Cabinet places; some into either house of Congress; some into the press; and some into other positions which give opportunities for enlightening influence upon public opinion.

And it is sometimes said, in the jaunty, off-hand way, so often used in dealing with important questions, that the diplomatic service is, after all, mainly recreation. Any American representative who goes abroad with this idea will soon find that he has made a serious mistake. A minister or secretary who does his duty, finds his leisure absolutely eaten up by multitudes of international matters, some large, some small, but all demanding attention. Were there time, I could give abundant examples of this. There is in every American embassy and legation a constant succession of matters requiring constant vigilance and the judicious exercise of firmness and conciliation.

Even what is called recreation is frequently hard work. I remember a dispatch from Mr. Lowell, in which, alluding to the fatigue of a great court function, he said that he relied upon it to make up in another world for a multitude of his sins in this. Many a diplomatist has had occasion to remember the remark that "life would be tolerable were it not for its pleasures."

And now, as to the present condition of the American diplomatic service. It is in many respects excellent; but it is badly organized,

¹ A century of our diplomatic service, at its present rate, would cost about fifty millions of dollars. A year's prolongation of our Civil War, by the interference of Great Britain, would have cost us, reckoning nothing for the increased expenditure to meet British hostilities, one thousand millions at least.

insufficiently provided for, and, as a rule, has not the standing which every patriotic American should wish for it. And yet it could easily be made one of the best, and quite possibly the best, in the world. The most essential and desirable improvements which I would present are, in a general way, as follows:

I. As regards the highest grade in the diplomatic service, that of Ambassadors, I would have, say, one-half their number appointed from those who have distinguished themselves as Ministers Plenipotentiary, and the remaining posts filled, as at present, from those who, in public life or in other important fields, have won recognition at home as men fit to maintain the character and watch the interests of their country abroad. And as to this highest rank, I would observe, as regards, say, one-half those holding it, the general rule of promotion for good service, and from the less important to the more important capitals.

II. As regards the second grade in the service—namely, that of Ministers Plenipotentiary—I would observe the same rule as in appointing Ambassadors, having, say, one-half of these at the more important capitals appointed for such as have especially distinguished themselves at the less important capitals, and, say, one-half of the Ministers Plenipotentiary at these less important capitals appointed from those who have distinguished themselves as Ministers Resident, or as Secretaries of Embassy or of Legation.

III. As to the third grade in our service, that of Ministers Resident, I would observe the general rule above suggested for the appointment of Ambassadors and Ministers Plenipotentiary; that is, I would appoint one-half of them from among those who shall have rendered most distinguished service as first Secretaries of Embassy or of Legation. When once appointed I would have them advanced for distinguished service from the less to the more important capitals, and, as far as possible, from the rank of Minister Resident to that of Minister Plenipotentiary.

IV. As to any lower, or special, or temporary grades, whether that of Diplomatic Agent, or special Chargé d'Affaires, or Commissioner, I would have appointments made from the diplomatic or consular service, or from public life in general, or from fitting men in private life, as the President or Secretary of State might think most conducive to the public interest.

V. I would have two grades of Secretaries of Legation and three grades of Secretaries of Embassy. I would have the lowest grade of secretaries appointed on the recommendation of the Secretary of State from those who have shown themselves, on due examina-

tion, best qualified in certain leading subjects, such as international law, the common or civil law or both, including, as absolutely necessary, some practice in one or the other of these, the history of treaties, general modern history, political economy, a speaking knowledge of French and a reading knowledge of at least one other foreign language.

As to the practice of the law, I would demand that every candidate should have been admitted to the bar and have been in practice at least two years. You ask, perhaps, why I lay such stress on the actual practice of the law. My reasons are two. First, in the interest of the service, I wish every Secretary to have been in touch with real men and real activities. Secondly, in the interest of the candidates, I do not wish to see a diplomatic proletariat. Bear in mind that the number of candidates for a regularly organized service would doubtless be large, and that the number to be appointed is small. Without this practical requirement we should have great numbers of ingenuous youth left with no occupation save cursing the unfitness of the Secretary of State or the stupidity of the examiners: *with* this requirement, the rejected would simply pursue the even tenor of their profession—all the better fitted for it by their diplomatic studies.

I would make the examination in all the above subjects strict, and would limit the selection of Secretaries of Legation and Embassy to the men thus presented. But, in view of the importance of various personal qualifications which fit men to influence their fellowmen, and which cannot be ascertained wholly by examination, I would leave the Secretary of State full liberty of choice among those who have honorably passed the examinations above required. The men thus selected and approved I would have appointed as Secretaries of the lower grades—that is, Third Secretaries of Embassy and Second Secretaries of Legation—and these men when once appointed should be promoted for good service, to the higher secretaryships of Embassy and Legation, and from the less to the more important capitals, under such rules as the State Department might find most conducive to the efficiency of the service. No new Secretaries of any grade should thereafter be appointed who had not passed the examinations required for the lowest grade of secretaries as above provided; but all who had already been in the service during two years should be eligible for promotion for good service, from whatever posts they might be occupying.

VI. I would attach to every Embassy three secretaries, to every Legation two, and to every post of Minister Resident, at least one.

One of the thoroughly wise arrangements of every British Embassy or Legation—an arrangement which has gone for much in Great Britain's remarkable series of diplomatic successes throughout the world—is to be seen in her maintaining at every capital a full number of Secretaries and Attachés. These serve, not only in keeping the current office work in the highest efficiency, but become, as it were, the *antenna* of the ambassador of Minister—additional eyes and ears to ascertain what is going on among those most influential in public affairs. Every Embassy or Legation thus equipped serves also as an actual and practical training-school for the service.

VII. I would appoint each Attaché from the ranks of those especially recommended and certified to in writing by leading authorities in the department for which he is expected to secure information: as, for example, Political Attachés by the State Department; Military Attachés by the War Department; Naval Attachés by the Navy Department; Financial Attachés by the Treasury Department; Commercial Attachés by the Department of Commerce; Agricultural Attachés by the Department of Agriculture; but always subject to the approval of the Secretary of State as regards sundry qualifications, hinted at above, which can better be ascertained by an interview than by an examination.

I would have a goodly number of Attachés of these various sorts, and, in our more important Embassies, one representative from each of the departments above named. Every Attaché, if fit for his place, would be worth far more than his cost to our government, for he would not only add to the influence of the Embassy or Legation, but to its efficiency. As a rule, all of them could also be made of real use after the conclusion of their foreign careers: some by returning to the army or navy and bringing their knowledge to bear upon those branches of the service; some by taking duty in the various departments at Washington, and aiding to keep the government abreast of the best practice in other countries; some by becoming professors in universities and colleges, or writers for the press, thus giving us, instead of loose guesses and haphazard suggestions, information based on close knowledge of international problems and of their solution in countries other than our own.

From these arrangements I feel warranted in expecting an evolution of better out of present good in our diplomatic service. Thus formed, it would become, in its main features, like the military and naval services, and, indeed, in its essential characteristics as to appointment and promotion, like any well organized manufacturing

or commercial establishment. It would absolutely require ascertained knowledge and fitness in the lowest grades, and it would give promotion for good service from first to last. Yet it would not be a cast iron system. For, it would admit and might well be construed to require the appointment of fully half of the Ambassadors, Ministers Plenipotentiary, and Ministers Resident from those who have shown decided fitness in high public positions at home, whether in important branches of public or private business, whenever the President should deem that the public interest requires it.

But the system thus proposed, while allowing the frequent bringing in of new and capable men from public life at home, requires that one-half of all representatives in each grade above that of Secretary (save certain special Diplomatic Agents, Special Commissioners, and the like), shall be appointed from those thoroughly trained for the service; and that all Secretaries, without exception, shall be thoroughly trained and fitted. Scope would thus be given to the activity of both sorts of men, and the whole system made sufficiently elastic to meet all necessities.

In the service thus organized, the class of Ambassadors and Ministers fitted by knowledge of public affairs at home for important negotiations abroad, but without experience in diplomatic life or in foreign usages and languages, would be greatly strengthened by Secretaries who had passed through a regular course of training and experience. An American diplomatic representative without diplomatic experience, on reaching his post, whether as Ambassador or Minister, would not find—as was once largely the case—Secretaries as inexperienced as himself in diplomatic business, but men thoroughly prepared to aid him in the multitude of minor matters, ignorance of which might very likely cripple him as regards very important business: Secretaries so experienced as to be able to set him in the way of knowing, at any court to which he is accredited, who are the men of real power, and who mere parasites and pretenders; what relations are to be cultivated and what avoided; which are the real channels of influence, and which mere illusions leading nowhither. On the other hand, the Secretaries thoroughly trained would doubtless, in their conversations with a man fresh from public affairs at home, learn many things of practical use and be kept in closer touch with American ideas and affairs.

Thus, too, what is of great importance throughout the entire service, every Ambassador, Minister Plenipotentiary, or Minister Resident would possess, or easily command, large experience of various men in various countries. At the same time, each representative

would be under most powerful incentives to perfect his own training, widen his acquaintance, and deepen his knowledge—incentives which, under the old system—with its lack of appointment for ascertained fitness, lack of promotion for good service, and lack of any certainty of tenure—exist very rarely if at all.

The system of promotion for merit throughout the service is no mere experiment; the good sense of all the leading nations of the world, except our own, has adopted it, and it works well. In our own service the old system works badly. For excellent men, both in its higher and lower grades, have been frequently crippled by want of proper experience or aid. We have, indeed, at this moment several admirable Secretaries—some of them fit to be Ambassadors or Ministers—but all laboring under conditions the most depressing—such as obtain in no good business enterprise. During my stay as Minister at St. Petersburg, the American Secretary of Legation, a man ideally fitted for his post, insisted on resigning. On my endeavoring to retain him, he answered as follows: “I have been over twelve years in the American diplomatic service as Secretary; I have seen the Secretaries from other countries, with whom I began my diplomatic career promoted until all of them still remaining in the service are in higher posts, several of them Ministers, and one an Ambassador. I remain as I was at the beginning, with no promotion and no probability of any. I feel that, as a rule, my present colleagues, as well as most officials with whom I have to do, seeing that I have not been advanced, look upon me as a failure. They cannot be made to understand how a man who has served so long as Secretary has been denied promotion for any reason save inefficiency. I can no longer submit to be thus looked down upon, and I must resign.”

But here it ought to be acknowledged that various recent administrations have taken steps toward a system of promotion in our diplomatic service; and the present administration, more broadly and logically than any other.

While thus adopting a system of promotion based upon efficiency, I would retain during good behavior, up to a certain age, the men who have done thoroughly well in the service. Clearly, when we secure an admirable man,—recognized as such in all parts of the world,—like Mr. Wheaton, Mr. Bancroft, Mr. Charles Francis Adams, Mr. Marsh, Mr. Townsend Harris, Mr. Washburne, Mr. Lowell, Mr. Bayard, Mr. E. J. Phelps, Mr. Walter Phelps, and others who have passed away, not to speak of many now living, we should

keep him at his post as long as he is efficient, without regard to his politics. This is the course taken very generally by other great nations, and especially by our sister republic of Great Britain (for Great Britain is simply a republic with a monarchical head lingering along on good behavior); she retains her representatives in these positions, and promotes them without regard to their party relations. During my first official residence at Berlin, although the home Government at London was of the Conservative party, it retained at the German capital, as Ambassador, Lord Amthill, a Liberal; and as first Secretary, Sir John Walsham, a Tory. The same indifference to party claims was evident at St. Petersburg during my two residences there, and at Berlin during my stay just closed. From every point of view, the long continuance, in diplomatic positions, of the most capable men would be of great advantage to our country.

But, as the very first thing to be done, whether our diplomatic service remains as at present or be improved, I would urge, as a condition precedent to any thoroughly good service, that there be in each of the greater capitals of the world at which we have a representative, a suitable embassy or legation building or apartment, owned or leased for a term of years by the American Government. Every other great power, and many of the smaller nations, have provided such quarters for their representatives, and some years ago President Cleveland recommended to Congress a similar policy. Under the present system the head of an American Embassy or Legation abroad is at a wretched disadvantage. In many capitals he finds it at times impossible to secure a proper furnished apartment; and, in some, very difficult to find any suitable apartment at all, whether furnished or unfurnished. Even if he finds proper rooms, they are frequently in an unfit quarter of the town, remote from the residences of his colleagues, from the public offices, from everybody and everything related to his work. His term of office being generally short, he is usually considered a rather undesirable tenant, and is charged accordingly. Besides this, the fitting and furnishing of such an apartment is a very great burden, as regards trouble, expense and time. Within my knowledge, two American Ministers abroad have impoverished their families by expenditures of this kind, and, without doubt, there have been many others. But this is not the worst. The most serious result of the existing system concerns our country. It is within my personal knowledge that in one very important international question our mistaken policy in this

respect recently cost the United States a sum which would have forever put that embassy on the very best footing,—as regards a permanent official residence. If an American Ambassador is to exercise a really strong influence for the United States as against other nations, he must be properly provided for as regards at least his residence;—not provided for, indeed, so largely as some representatives of other nations, for I neither propose nor desire that the American representatives shall imitate the pomp of certain Ambassadors of the greater European powers;—but he ought to be enabled to live respectably and discharge his duties efficiently. There should be, in this, what Thomas Jefferson acknowledged in the Declaration of Independence as a duty,—“a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.” The present condition of things is frequently humiliating,—and not only to the Ambassador or Minister, but to every thoughtful American traveller. In the greater capitals of Europe the general public know the British, French, Austrian, Italian, and all other important Embassies or Legations, except that of our country. The American Embassy or Legation has no settled home, is sometimes in one quarter of the town, sometimes in another;—sometimes almost in an attic, sometimes almost in a cellar;—generally inadequate in its accommodations, and frequently unfortunate in its surroundings. Personal experience in various European capitals has shown me that one secret of the great success of British diplomacy in all parts of the world is that especial pains are taken regarding this point, and that, consequently, every British Embassy is the center of a widespread social influence which counts for very much indeed in its political influence. The United States, as perhaps the wealthiest nation in existence,—a nation far reaching in the exercise of its foreign policy, with vast and increasing commercial and other interests throughout the world,—should, in all substantial matters, be equally provided for. Take our relations with Turkey. We have constantly a vast number of Americans of the very best sort, and especially missionaries, teachers, and men of business, who have to be protected throughout the whole of that vast empire. Each of the other great powers provides for its representative at Constantinople a residence honorable, suitable, and within a proper enclosure for its protection; but the American Minister lives anywhere and everywhere,—in such premises, over shops and warehouses, as can be secured,—and he is liable, in case of trouble between the two nations, to suffer personal violence and to have the house sacked by a Turkish mob. No foreign people, and least of all an Oriental people, can highly respect a diplomatic representative who, by his

surroundings, seems to them not respected by his own people. The American Government can easily afford the expenditure needed to provide proper houses or apartments for its entire diplomatic corps, but it cannot afford *not* to provide these. Full provision for them would not burden any American citizen to the amount of a Boston biscuit. Leaving matters in their present condition is in the long run far more costly.

It seems incontestable that our diplomatic service ought not to be left in its present slipshod condition. It ought to be put on the best and most effective footing possible, so that, everywhere, the men we send forth to support and advance the manifold interests of our country shall be thoroughly well equipped and provided for. But whether the system I have indicated be adopted or not, whether salaries be increased or not, the permanent possession of a suitable house or apartment in every leading capital is absolutely the foremost and most elementary of necessities. And, in order to free my mind, I will add that, while the provision for a proper embassy or legation building is the first of all things necessary, it might also be well to increase somewhat the salaries of our representatives abroad. These may seem large even at present; but the cost of living has greatly increased since they were fixed, and the special financial demands upon an Ambassador or Minister at any of the most important posts are always far beyond the present salary. It is utterly impossible for an American diplomatic representative to do his duty on the salary now given, even while living on the most moderate scale known in the diplomatic corps. To attempt to do so would deprive him of all opportunity to exercise that friendly, personal, social influence which is so important an element in his success.

To sum up my suggestions as to this part of the subject, I should say: First, and foremost, as essential, that there be provided, at each diplomatic post where the United States has a representative, a spacious and suitable house or apartment, either bought by our Government or taken on a long lease. Secondly, as highly desirable, that American representatives of all grades should have their salaries increased by from twenty-five to fifty per cent. Thirdly, that an additional number of Secretaries and Attachés should be provided in the manner and for the reasons above mentioned.

Even if the carrying out of these reforms should require an appropriation to the diplomatic service sixty per cent. higher than it now is, which is an amount greater than, in my opinion, would be really required by all the expenditures I propose, including interest

upon the purchase money of appropriate quarters for our representatives abroad,—the total additional cost to each citizen of the United States would be but a trifle over one-quarter of one cent per year.

As to suitable requirements for secretaryships, and proper promotion throughout the whole service, they would vastly increase its attractiveness, in all its grades, to the very men whom the country most needs. They would open to young men in our universities, colleges, and schools of all grades a most honorable career leading such institutions to establish courses of instruction with reference to such a service—courses which were long since established in Germany, but which have arrived nearest perfection in two of our sister republics—at the University of Zurich in Switzerland, and in the *Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques* in Paris.

And now, a few words in conclusion. You will have observed that my attempt has been to develop my subject in the simplest manner possible. I have carefully avoided the profounder questions connected with the subject: discussions of present and future American policy and the like, for the reason that I have wished to give merely those elementary considerations which may enable any American citizen to draw from them a straightforward conclusion as to things fundamentally necessary.

A word also in self-defense. My own connection with the foreign service of the United States has extended over fifty years, during which at various periods and posts, I have discharged diplomatic or quasi-diplomatic duties. In speaking of the defects of our present system and their remedies, I would above all things wish it to be understood that I am not a man with a grievance—that I have no complaints to make, whatever. On the contrary, I feel profoundly grateful to the various administrations—of both parties—under which I have served, for their support and kindness. This paper is the result of a decision made many years ago, that after the conclusion of my connection with the diplomatic service—when no human being could charge against me a desire to do anything for my own personal comfort or satisfaction—I would present, in the simplest and clearest manner possible, my view of the best course to be taken in developing and improving our diplomatic establishment—in the interest of our country; and in no other interest whatever.

It seems to me certain that a proper development of the existing service, on the general lines I have presented, would not only increase the prestige and influence of the United States among her sister nations, but, purely from a commercial point of view, would amply

repay us. To have in diplomatic positions at the various capitals a large proportion of men thoroughly fitted, not only as regards character and intelligence, but also as regards experience and acquaintance, and to have them enabled to exert their abilities under the best conditions, would be, from every point of view, of the greatest advantage to our country, materially and politically, and would give strength to our policy throughout the world.

